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Many firms make pricing and assortment decisions on an ongoing basis. Furthermore,
such decisions are often made in the face of demand uncertainty and must take into
account associated inventory costs. The assortment, prices and inventory decisions
interact in ways that should not be overlooked when making decisions. However, such
interactions are often ignored both in practice and research. This dissertation studies
a series of problems, in which there is much to gain by making assortment, pricing
and inventory decisions simultaneously.
The growing importance of assortment planning is evidenced by the increasing
number of retail chains who have adopted sophisticated solutions that perform as-
sortment planning at the individual store level. In a survey conducted in 2005, 64%
of retail chains reported that they either adopted, or would adopt within two years,
state-of the-art assortment planning solutions.1 One retail chain that did so is Stop
& Shop, which announced in 2008 that it was expanding its use of an assortment
planning software (IRI Loyalty Analytics Assortment Planner).2 Another example is
Bakers Footwear, which invested in Marketmax Assortment Planning software.3
1“An RIS White Paper: Driving Profitability through Assortment Optimization,” last
retrieved from http://www.businessobjects.com/pdf/solutions/retail/wp_profitibility_
through_assortment_optimization.pdf on 10/7/08.
2“Stop & Shop Expands Customer-Centric Assortment Planning Using IRI Loyalty Analyt-
ics,” May 2008, Reuters, last retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/
idUS163109+13-May-2008+BW20080513 on 11/13/09.
3“One step ahead of the competition,” last retrieved from http://www.sas.com/success/
bakers.html on 11/12/09.
1
It appears that price optimization software has gained as much traction among
retailers as assortment planning software. For example, in 2008, Super S Foods, and
operator of grocery stores, selected KSS Retail as its provider of price optimization
software, after stating that retailers that have used this software consistently show
positive results in terms of increasing their market competitiveness.4
As retailers are becoming more sophisticated in their assortment planning and
pricing, the manufacturers are following suit. For example, SignalDemand, a re-
cent entry into the pricing software market, now boasts food manufacturers such as
Cargill, Hormel Foods, and Chiquita among its customers. Cargill uses SignalDe-
mand’s product to price many different cuts of meat in response to popularity and
production capacity.5 Another example is Seagate Technologies, a hard drive supplier,
who in 2008, joined the growing list of companies using price optimization software.
Seagate’s Director of Global Pricing, argues that companies that implement price
optimization software typically gain a minimum of a 2-percent improvement in their
margins. Interestingly, the software Seagate is implementing takes into account op-
erational considerations by identifying the cost to serve particular customers which
includes freight, fuel surcharges and logistics support.6
Given the growing interest in assortment and pricing software among retailers
and manufacturers, it is not surprising that operations management researchers have
become increasingly interested in assortment planning and pricing problems in the
presence of operational costs. In this dissertation we contribute to the stream of
operations management literature that studies assortment planning and pricing in the
4Super S Foods selects KSS Retail to provide predictive pricing using price and promotion opti-
mization,” July 2008, Business Wire, last retrieved from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0EIN/is_2008_July_1/ai_n27876436/?tag=content;col1 on 11/21/09.
5Daniel Bogoslaw, “Food Companies: Recipes for Tough Times,” Business Week, 7/18/08, last re-
trieved from http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jul2008/pi20080717_554529.
htm on 10/7/08.
6Doug Henschen, “Price Optimization Software Helps Seagate Boost Profits,” Intelligent Enter-




presence of operational costs. In particular, the dissertation addresses two important
practical considerations that have received little attention so far: (1) the presence of
complementary products whose assortments and prices influence each other’s demand,
and (2) a manufacturer’s use of dual sales channels that sell overlapping assortments.
1.1. Research Questions
We next describe the research questions, addressed by this dissertation, pertaining
to the two important practical considerations discussed above.
1.1.1 Single firm with complementary categories of products
Joint assortment and pricing decisions in the presence of inventory considerations
have recently received attention in the operations literature, e.g. Aydın and Porteus
(2008) and Maddah and Bish (2007). However, this work addresses the pricing and
inventory decisions for a single-category assortment. The coordination of multiple-
category assortments has been typically addressed as a marketing problem, where it
is common to find this type of work without inventory considerations. See Russell et
al. (1997) for a review. In this dissertation, we address a problem where a single firm
must choose the assortments of two distinct components that go into a final product
configured by the customer, which can be thought of as a two-category problem with
complementary categories. Together with the assortment decision, the firm must also
decide on the prices in the presence of stochastic demand. The questions we address
in this setting are: (1) How do several characteristics of the variants (e.g., customer
appeal, unit purchase cost, unit holding and shortage costs and demand variability)
combine to determine which variants should be included in the assortment? (2)
Can we develop practical pricing rules to capture the optimal pricing behavior? (3)
What effects do inventory-related parameters have on the optimal assortment and
prices? (4) What influence does the marketing strategy for a component (in particular,
whether or not the component is marketed as an impulse purchase) has on the optimal
3
assortment and pricing decision?
1.1.2 Two-echelon, dual-channel supply chain with a single category
In certain supply chains, the manufacturer sells not only through a retailer, but
also through a direct sales channel, which makes the manufacturer both a supplier
to and a competitor of the retailer. This is what we refer to as a two-echelon, dual-
channel supply chain. In any supply chain, the assortment and pricing decisions are
crucial not only for the retailer, but also for its supplier. These decisions require even
more scrutiny in a two-echelon, dual-channel supply chain, given the complicated
nature of the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer.
There is a growing amount of work in the economics, marketing, and operations
literatures that addresses the pricing strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer
in a two-echelon, dual-channel supply chain. The overwhelming majority of this
work, especially in the operations literature, focuses on a supply chain that sells a
single item. This dissertation contributes to this stream of research by addressing
the assortment and pricing decisions that arise when the two channels are selling an
overlapping assortment of substitutable products.
This dissertation addresses the following research questions in the context of a
two-echelon, dual-channel supply chain: (1) What practical pricing rules, if any,
characterize the optimal retail and wholesale pricing behavior? (2) What types of
conflicts, if any, may arise between the manufacturer and the retailer when it comes
to the assortment offered through the retailer? (3) What are the benefits, if any, for
the manufacturer to use a dual-channel strategy? (4) What role do inventory-related
parameters play in the optimal assortment and pricing?
1.2. Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized into four chapters as follows.
Chapter II analyzes the pricing and assortment problem with inventory consider-
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ations for a single firm selling a configurable product (e.g. a computer). This product
is a combination of two components, one of which is a required component in that it
must be bought for the product to function (e.g. hard drive), and the other is an op-
tional component that the customer may wish to add to the product (e.g. speakers).
The firm must decide the assortment of variants to be offered for each component as
well as the variants’ prices.
The chapter finds that, in the optimal solution, the prices of the required com-
ponent’s variants must be such that all variants will share the same effective profit
margin, which is the unit gross margin net of inventory-related costs. On the other
hand, all variants of the optional component will be sold at effective cost to drive
store traffic. As for the assortment selection, the chapter provides a specific measure
of a variant’s profitability, labeled surplus, which brings together many supply-side
and demand-side parameters. The surpluses of the variants that go into a product
configuration combine together to determine the attractiveness of the configuration.
The chapter shows how a firm can choose between two variants by comparing the
attractiveness of the product configurations enabled by those variants.
Chapter III extends Chapter II in three ways: First, it explores the pricing and
assortment decisions in a scenario where only the required component drives store
traffic and the optional component is an impulse purchase. Here, in contrast to the
model in Chapter II, the optional component will now be a profit driver for the
retailer, which highlights the importance that the marketing strategy has on the
pricing decision. Second, this chapter presents a model that considers two customers
segments, one of which is interested in buying only the optional component, perhaps
as an add-on for a product they bought earlier. In this case, the chapter identifies
a price-discrimination strategy that the firm can use to improve its profit and that
can be implemented through the use of discounts. Third, a generalization of the
model in Chapter II is presented where the two components are still complementary
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but each can function without the other component. The chapter shows that, under
this generalization, it remains optimal to charge the same effective margin for all the
variants of a given component.
Chapter IV presents the pricing and assortment problems in a two-echelon, dual-
channel supply chain. In this chapter’s model, a manufacturer sells through its own
direct channel as well as through a retailer. The chapter shows that the manu-
facturer’s wholesale prices must be such that all variants have the same ‘weighted’
wholesale price, where the weight is a measure of the retailer’s service level and the
variant’s demand variability. One managerial implication of this result is that variants
with larger demand variability will carry lower wholesale price tags. As for the as-
sortment decision, the chapter studies the assortment that will be offered through the
retailer under various scenarios, which differ in who chooses the retailer’s assortment
(the manufacturer or the retailer itself) and the timing of the assortment decision
relative to pricing decisions. The chapter characterizes the scenarios that lead to a
conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer in terms of the assortment to be
offered through the retailer. For example, the chapter finds that, in certain cases, the
retailer may want to offer a variant with low demand variability while the manufac-
turer prefers an item with higher demand variability. In addition, the manufacturer
prefers an assortment that is larger than the one preferred by the retailer.
Chapter V concludes and summarizes the contributions of the dissertation. The
main contributions are: (1) modeling and analyzing assortment planning and pricing
problems for two complementary items in the presence of inventory considerations,
(2) characterizing the effect of inventory-related costs on the optimal pricing policy
for two complementary assortments, (3) obtaining a practical measure of a variant’s
profitability, which can guide assortment selection for complementary items, (4) high-
lighting the pricing implications of marketing an item as an impulse purchase, (5)
characterizing the optimal wholesale pricing policy in a two-echelon, dual-channel
6
supply chain, where the manufacturer is both a supplier to and competitor of the
retailer, and (6) identifying conflicts that may arise between the manufacturer and
the retailer with regard to the assortment offered through the retailer.
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Chapter II
Assortment Selection and Pricing for Configurable Products
2.1. Introduction
Consider a configurable product, formed by putting together several components,
each of which gives the customer several choices as to color, size, performance, etc.
Many different products, ranging from modular furniture to cars, fit this general de-
scription, but perhaps the prototypical example is the personal computer: A customer
configures a computer by choosing from several processor speeds, memory sizes, mon-
itor types, etc. This chapter explores the assortment and pricing decisions for such
configurable products in the presence of demand uncertainty.
A firm offering a configurable product must decide what level of variety to offer
for each component. For example, a computer assembler does not necessarily carry
the entire array of processors in the market or offer all possible variants of monitors.
Of course, one component’s assortment influences another component’s demand. For
instance, if a computer assembler shrinks its assortment of processors, the demand for
monitors may decrease, because some customers who do not find their ideal processor
may choose to shop elsewhere. The model presented in this chapter recognizes such
complementarity among component demands.
For most configurable products, the price of a configuration is determined by the
components that go into it, each of which is individually priced. For example, this
is typically the case when ordering a personal computer. Accordingly, in the model
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presented, the firm chooses the price of each choice offered for every component.
These prices then add up to determine the price of a configuration.
One can draw an important distinction between two types of components that go
into a configurable product: required versus optional components. Some components
are required in that the product could not function without them, for example, a
computer’s processor. Others are optional in that the product could still be complete
without them, for example, an external speaker. A customer who decides to make
a purchase will necessarily buy the required components, but may choose not to
purchase the optional components. The model includes these two distinct types of
components.
The firm’s assortment and pricing decisions play out in an environment where
inventory considerations are important. Returning to the personal computer example,
the possibility of a stockout is very real, especially when the demand for computers
hits seasonal highs (for example, during the back-to-school period). On the flipside,
a firm also incurs holding costs for on-hand inventory, e.g. due to obsolescence risk
in the case of personal computers. Hence, the possibility of overage and underage
needs to be taken into account when making the assortment and pricing decisions.
The model incorporates inventory-related costs due to overage and underage.
The model’s ability to incorporate inventory-related costs produces a number of
useful managerial insights. For example, we find that the optimal prices are such that
all variants of a component share the same effective profit margin, which is defined
as the selling price net of unit purchase cost and unit inventory cost, where the
unit inventory cost itself is a function of a variant’s unit underage and overage cost,
service level and demand variability. This result offers support for certain pricing
practices such as higher quality variants typically carrying higher gross margins (that
is, unit selling price minus unit purchase cost) or out-of-ordinary colors of a component
carrying higher price tags. The former practice makes sense, because using the same
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effective margin for all variants would result in higher gross margins for high quality
variants, assuming that such variants have higher overage costs. The latter practice
makes sense, because, even if the color makes no discernible difference in terms of the
firm’s purchase cost or the customer’s willingness to pay, out-of-ordinary colors would
still command higher prices if their demand variability and, hence, their inventory
costs, are larger than the standard colors.
The results about assortment selection underscore the importance of the variant’s
surplus, which is a measure of the variant’s profitability that depends not only on
the customer’s utility from the variant, but also on the variant’s unit purchase cost,
unit underage and overage costs, service level and demand variability. The results
reveal that when choosing from two variants of a given component, the firm should
pick the one with the higher surplus. However, when choosing from two variants that
belong to different components, it is not enough to compare the variants’ surpluses.
In such a case, one must take into account the complementarity between the demands
of two components. In particular, one could choose from two variants that belong to
different components by comparing the attractiveness of the new configurations that
are enabled by the addition of each variant. To that end, the results provide a precise
definition for the attractiveness of a configuration, which draws upon the variants’
surpluses.
This chapter is organized as follows. Next section contains a review of the related
literature. The model is introduced in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 provides its analysis.
All of the results in Section 2.4 are obtained under the assumption that the demand is
a multiplicative random perturbation of the expected demand. Section 2.5 provides
a discussion on how the results change when the randomness is additive. Finally,
Section 2.6 summarizes the managerial implications and contributions. The proofs
are included in Appendix A.
2.2. Literature Review
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In its broadest sense the assortment problem is choosing what subset of a given
set of products to offer. Pentico (2008) reviews the body of work on the assortment
problem in this broad sense. This chapter is related to the subset of this research
that deals with assortment planning in retail operations. Such problems have been
studied in the economics, marketing and operations literature. For a recent review,
see Kök, Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2008). Here we focus on the stream of the op-
erations literature that studies the tradeoff between the higher revenues achieved by
larger assortments and the inventory burden of offering such broad assortments. The
inclusion of inventory-related costs is what separates this body of work from that in
economics and marketing. van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Smith and Agrawal
(2000) seem to be among the first to consider such problems. When modeling how the
customer demand is split among several alternatives, van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999)
use the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model while Smith and Agrawal (2000) use
an exogenously-specified substitution pattern. Subsequently, both types of demand
models have been utilized to further analyze assortment planning in the presence of
inventory considerations. Using the MNL model, Li (2007) extends van Ryzin and
Mahajan (1999) by allowing the price and cost parameters to differ across variants.
Using an exogenously-specified substitution pattern, Kök and Fisher (2007) propose
a methodology to estimate the substitution parameters from sales data and they de-
velop a heuristic method to select the assortment and to set the inventory levels in
the presence of shelf space constraints. Yücel, Karaesmen, Salman and Türkay (2009)
also use an exogenously specified substitution pattern, and they study supplier selec-
tion and assortment planning in the presence of shelf space limitations. Departing
from both the MNL choice model and exogenously-specified substitution patterns,
Gaur and Honhon (2006) study the retail assortment planning problem using a loca-
tional choice model. Rajaram (2001), on the other hand, analyzes a catalog retailer’s
assortment planning problem, in which the consumer choice is of secondary impor-
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tance in that the demand for an item does not depend on what other items are offered
in the assortment. This chapter is in the spirit of van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and
Li (2007) in that it also uses the MNL model. However, this chapter’s work differs
in two important ways from the earlier work cited so far. First, the work cited so
far studies assortment planning in the presence of exogenously fixed prices whereas
this chapter studies a joint pricing and assortment selection problem. In addition,
all of the earlier work cited so far study single-category assortment planning, while
this chapter addresses a problem where the firm must choose the assortments of two
distinct components with complementary demands.
Other recent work that studies joint inventory and pricing decisions for assortment
planning include Maddah and Bish (2007) and Aydın and Porteus (2008). The latter
studies inventory and pricing decisions for a given assortment, whereas the former
studies joint inventory, assortment and pricing decisions. Both Aydın and Porteus
(2008) and Maddah and Bish (2007) study single-category assortment planning, while
here the focus is on assortment planning for two components with complementary
demands.
The two-component assortment planning problem in this chapter is akin to mul-
tiple category assortment planning, studied in the marketing literature. See Russell
et al. (1997) for a review. Assortment planning for complementary products has
received scant attention in operations management. One exception is Agrawal and
Smith (2003) who deal with such a problem in the absence of pricing. In their model,
products are complementary in the sense that there exist customers who wish to pur-
chase a set of products, and if one product is out-of-stock, then the demand for other
products in the customer’s set may also be lost. Cachon and Kök (2007) also study
assortment planning for complementary products. Specifically, they consider multi-
ple competing firms, each of which is selling multiple categories whose demands are
complementary. Cachon and Kök (2007) focus on the equilibrium assortments that
12
arise in their competition model. We drop competition. Furthermore, in this chap-
ter’s setting the product categories have a specific interpretation: the categories are
the required and optional components that come together in a configurable product.
The focus is on the optimal pricing of the required versus optional components. In
addition, this chapter deals explicitly with the effect of inventory-related parameters
on the optimal assortment.
2.3. Model Description
Consider a product made up of two components. One of these components is re-
quired in the sense that the product cannot function without it. The other component
is optional in the sense that it adds some functionality to the product or enhances the
use of it, but the product can function even without this component. Hereafter, refer
to these components as the required component (e.g., an iPhone) and the optional
component (e.g., a carrying case). For both the required and optional components,
the firm offers multiple variants (e.g., 8GB versus 16GB iPhone, a slider case versus
a flipper case). Let SR denote the set of variants for the required component and SO
the set of variants for the optional component. The product is configurable, that is,
the customer can configure the product to her taste by combining a variant of the
required component with a variant of the optional component. The model allows the
possibility that the customer chooses not to purchase the optional component. In
addition, if there is no configuration that beats the “no-purchase” alternative, then
the customer may choose not to purchase the product at all.
In keeping with the setting of configurable products, we model the case where the
firm stocks each variant separately. In other words, the firm stocks the components,
but not the assembled, finished product. Furthermore, the price for a given configu-
ration is the sum of the prices of the variants that make up the configuration. Let pRi
denote the price of required component’s variant i ∈ SR, and pOj the price of optional
component’s variant j ∈ SO.
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2.3.1 The Choice Model
Consider an individual customer who is presented with an assortment of variants
for the required component and an assortment of variants for the optional component.
The customer must decide whether to purchase the product and, if so, what config-
uration to purchase. As described next, the customer’s decision is modeled using
the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model. Let U[ij] denote the customer’s random
utility from the configuration that combines variant i of the required component with
variant j of the optional component.1 In addition, let U[i0] denote the customer’s
utility from the configuration that consists of required component’s variant i only
(i.e., a configuration that excludes the optional component). The customer’s utility
from configuration [ij] is given by
U[ij] = αRi + αOj − pRi − pOj + ξ[ij], i ∈ SR and j ∈ SO,
where αnk is the utility contribution of variant k of component n ∈ {R,O} and ξ[ij]
is a random error term. One could easily incorporate different weights for the utility
contributions of the required and optional components. This utility model is in the
spirit of models widely used for conjoint analysis, where a customer’s utility from a
multi-attribute product is modeled as the summation of part-worth, each of which
is the customer’s utility from a certain attribute. See, in particular, Louviere and
Woodworth (1983) who use a similar utility model to fit the aggregate choice data
for multi-attribute alternatives. Similarly, the customer’s utility from configuration
[i0], which consists of required component’s variant i, but excludes the optional com-
ponent, is given by
U[i0] = αRi + αO − pRi + ξ[i0], i ∈ SR,
where αO is the utility contribution of not purchasing the optional component. In
1As a notational convention, brackets are used around subscripts to indicate a configuration that
brings together two variants, one of each component.
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addition, the customer may choose not to purchase from the firm. Let U0 denote the
customer’s utility from not purchasing. Here, U0 can be thought of as the aggregate
utility from a number of choices exogenous to the model, such as the utility from
purchasing the product from an alternate firm or the utility from purchasing a dif-
ferent product altogether. This utility is also given by an expected utility, α0, plus a
random error term ξ0:
U0 = α0 + ξ0.
An implicit assumption of this utility model is that the utility contribution of compo-
nent n’s variant k is given by αnk, and it is independent of what variant the customer
chooses for the other component. One limitation of this assumption is that it does
not capture the case where a variant’s appeal may depend on what variant it will be
matched with. Here the focus is on a simpler complementarity relationship, which
nonetheless captures many practical applications. For example, the utility of having
a slider case for an iPhone is unlikely to depend on the memory size of the phone.
Following the MNL model, this model assumes that ξ[ij], i ∈ SR and j ∈ SO ∪ {0}
and ξ0 follow a Gumbel distribution whose mean is zero and scale parameter is one,
and these error terms are independent across products. The customer then makes the
choice that maximizes her utility. (For more on the MNL model, see, for example,
Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985.) According to the MNL model, the probability that










where pn denotes the vector of prices for component n ∈ {R,O}, v[ij](pRi, pOj) :=
exp(αRi + αOj − pRi − pOj) for i ∈ SR and j ∈ SO and v[i0] := exp(αRi + αO − pRi).
Likewise the probability that the customer will not purchase any of the products
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The probability that a customer chooses variant i of the required component,
denoted by qRi, is then given by the sum of the probabilities that a customer chooses




q[ij](SR, SO,pR,pO), i ∈ SR. (2.3)
Similarly, the probability that a customer chooses variant j of the optional component,
denoted by qOj, is
qOj(SR, SO,pR,pO) =
∑
i∈SR q[ij](SR, SO,pR,pO), j ∈ SO. (2.4)
2.3.2 The Aggregate Demand Model
The purchase probabilities in (2.3) and (2.4) serve as the starting point to model
the aggregate demand for a variant. Specifically, it is assumed that the aggregate, ran-
dom demand for variant k of component n ∈ {R,O}, denoted by Dnk(SR, SO,pR,pO),
is given by
Dnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) ∼ qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)εnk for k ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O},
where εnk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σnk. Notice that σnk amounts to the coefficient of variation of demand for variant k
of component n. Assuming that the mean of εnk is one amounts to a normalization
of the demand size.
One important consequence of multiplicative randomness is that the coefficient of
variation of demand is constant with respect to prices. To capture other cases where
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the coefficient of variation depends on prices, one could use a combination of both
additive and multiplicative perturbations. However, such a model leads to an ana-
lytically intractable problem. Instead, we first assume a multiplicative perturbation.
Then in Section 2.5, the results for the case with additive perturbation are discussed.
For a comparison of multiplicative versus additive randomness in single-product in-
ventory and pricing problems, see Petruzzi and Dada (1999).
2.3.3 The Firm’s Problem
The firm’s problem is modeled as a one-period problem. The firm chooses its
assortment, SR ∪ SO, the variants’ prices and the stock levels at the beginning of the
period. Let ynk denote the stock level of variant k of component n, and cnk its unit
purchase cost. The demands for all variants, Dnk’s are then realized. The leftover
inventory of variant k of component n incurs an overage cost of conk per unit. Excess
demand for variant k of component n is backordered at a unit cost of cunk.
The assumption of backordering is plausible for configurable products that are
assembled after an order is placed, for example, personal computers. There are other
retail settings where backordering may be a viable option. For example, if a customer
chooses to purchase a desk and a hutch from Officemax.com, but the hutch is out-of-
stock, the customer can still purchase the desk and have the hutch delivered at a later
time. Admittedly, however, not all customers will choose to backorder. To the extent
that customers are willing to substitute when their favorite product is out of stock,
one would have to model such switching behavior. Unfortunately, in a model that
allows such stockout-induced substitutions, the effective demand for a product is a
function of the stock levels for other products, which in turn makes for an intractable
inventory and pricing problem.
Notice the implicit assumption that the unit cost of backordering does not depend
on the prices. This is likely to be the case when the cost of backordering is dominated
by supply-side activities such as expedited production or emergency shipments. This
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assumption helps analytical tractability by removing the effect of the selling price on
the unit underage cost. In comparison, in a model with lost sales, the unit underage
cost will boil down to the unit profit margin, which would then be a function of the
selling price.
























Here, the function Lnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) represents the expected overage and under-
age cost associated with variant k of component n. Let µDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) and
σDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) denote the mean and standard deviation of the demand for variant
k of component n. Define
znk :=
ynk − µDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)
σDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)
,
which can be interpreted as the service level for variant k of component n, measured in
standard deviations above the mean. In fact, given the assumption that the demand
for variant k of component n is normally distributed with mean µDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)
and standard deviation σDnk(SR, SO,pR,pO), the value of znk uniquely determines the
probability that variant k ∈ Sn will not run out of stock, which is typically re-
ferred to as type-1 service level. More precisely, the type-1 service level for variant
k ∈ Sn is ΦN(znk), where ΦN(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. In
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this paper, it is assumed that znk’s are exogenously fixed. This is equivalent to
assuming that the firm fixes a certain type-1 service level for each variant. Alterna-
tively, for a given assortment and prices, one could assume that the firm picks the
stock level for each variant to minimize its expected inventory costs. In such a case,
the optimal stock level would satisfy the standard critical fractile solution where















. All subsequent analysis would carry over for znk values fixed at
those optimal levels. Nonetheless, it’s assumed here that znk’s are fixed exogenously
in order to investigate the effect of service levels on the assortment decisions.
Given the assumption that the demand for each variant is normally distributed,
the expected underage and overage cost function in (2.6), Lnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) can be
simplified as follows:2











where IN is the unit normal loss function defined as IN(z) := φN(z)− z(1− ΦN(z))
and, φN(·) and ΦN(·) are the standard normal density and distribution functions
respectively. Substituting (2.7) in (2.5) and recalling that µDnk = qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)

























. Notice from above that γnk works as
a unit cost incurred by the firm and it depends only on unit overage cost, conk, unit
underage cost, cunk, the service level znk and demand’s coefficient of variation, σnk. In




nk and σnk here correspond
to c, p and σ, respectively, in Porteus (2002).
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other words, all of the inventory-related costs are incorporated to the firm’s objective
function in the form of parameter γnk. Using this definition, one can now write the






(pnk − cnk − γnk)qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO). (2.8)
This simple form of the profit function is a culmination of, in particular, the assump-
tion that the demand for each variant is normally distributed and the assumption that
the excess demand is backordered. The firm’s problem is to choose the assortments





As the subsequent section and the next chapter will illustrate, this model is simple
enough to be analytically tractable, yet sophisticated enough to capture the interac-
tions among the assortment, prices and inventory levels.
2.4. Results for the Base Model: Multiplicative Demand Model
The pricing problem is first analyzed given an assortment of variants. Given that
the firm will price any assortment optimally, the firm’s assortment selection problem
and the effect of inventory-related parameters on the assortment decisions will follow.
2.4.1 Optimal Pricing of a Given Assortment
In preparation for the next result, consider a make-to-order firm offering an as-
sortment of substitutable products, denoted by S. Suppose that the unit retail price
of variant k is pk and the firm’s only cost is the purchase cost, ck per unit of variant
k. Furthermore, suppose that the customers are choosing from the assortment ac-
cording to the MNL model. It is well known that the optimal prices for this problem
satisfy the equal margin property ; i.e., pk− ck is the same for all k ∈ S at the optimal
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prices. (See, for example, Besanko et al., 1998.) The pricing problem that arises in
this chapter’s model embellishes in a number of ways the simpler problem outlined
above: the product is a combination of two components, which are to be priced sep-
arately; the customer purchase decision depends on the entire assortment and prices
of all variants; the firm makes to stock, which results in inventory costs when the
demand does not match the stock level. Nonetheless, the following result shows that
a modified version of the equal margin property is maintained in this model.
Proposition 1. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Let mnk := pnk− cnk− γnk denote





, all variants k of component n will have the same effective profit
margin, i.e., mnk = mn for all k ∈ Sn.
There is one crucial difference between this result and the “equal margin property”
obtained by earlier work on assortment pricing under logit-type choice models (e.g.,
Besanko et al., 1998, Anderson and de Palma, 1992, Aydın and Ryan, 2000): The
earlier work finds that the unit gross margin (i.e., unit retail price minus unit purchase
cost) should be the same across all variants while here the effective margins (unit gross
margin net of the inventory cost parameter, γnk) must be the same. In practice, gross
margins are hardly ever equal; in fact, higher quality variants tend to have higher gross
margins. For example, data from Cars.com show that the gross margin (the difference
between the manufacturer suggested retail price and the invoice price) for a 2009
Honda Civic increases progressively as one moves up the ladder of trim levels, from DX
to LX to EX to EX-L to Si. This model’s result provides one possible motivation for
the attraction of applying higher gross margins to higher quality variants: According
to Proposition 1, what should be the same across variants is the effective margin,
not the gross margin. Because it costs more to produce a higher quality variant and
because part of the unit overage cost is the cost of capital tied in inventory, such
variants tend to have higher unit overage costs as well. Hence, the inventory cost
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parameter, γnk, tends to be higher for higher quality variants. Consequently, if the
firm charges the same effective margin for all variants, the gross margins will be larger
for high quality variants.
The equal margin property described in Proposition 1 allows recasting the pricing




, the pricing problem can be
simplified to choosing two margins: mR for the required component and mO for the
optional component. In order to help with such a reformulation, first define the unit
surplus of variant k ∈ Sn:
ηnk := αnk − cnk − γnk. (2.9)
In addition, define ηO := αO as the surplus of the no-purchase option for the optional
component. Notice that ηnk is the difference between the customer’s expected utility
from variant k ∈ Sn, αnk, and the unit cost incurred by the firm for variant k ∈ Sn,
cnk + γnk. Hence, one could interpret ηnk as the total surplus created by one unit of
the variant exchanging hands from the firm to the customer. Taking advantage of
the equal effective margin property stated in Proposition 1 and using the parameter
ηnk, one can rewrite the product’s purchase probability, q[ij](SR, SO,pR,pO), given by
(2.1), as:
q[ij](SR, SO,mR,mO) =





j∈SO exp(ηOj −mO) + exp(ηO0)
] ,







j∈SO exp(ηOj −mO) + exp(ηO0)
] , i ∈ SR.
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Likewise, the probability of not purchasing from the firm, q0(SR, SO,pR,pO), given by











A variant’s choice probability is then obtained by adding together the choice proba-








q[ik](SR, SO,mR,mO) for all k ∈ SO ∪ {0}. (2.11)
Using the redefined choice probabilities, one can now write the firm’s expected profit,
Π(SR, SO,pR,pO), given by (2.8), as a function of the margins instead of price vectors:
Π(SR, SO,mR,mO) = mR[1− q0(SR, SO,mR,mO)] +mO




In preparation for the next result, rewrite the firm’s profit in (2.12) as
Π(SR, SO,mR,mO) = (mR +mO) [1− q0(SR, SO,mR,mO)]−mOqO(SR, SO,mR,mO).
Notice from above that the firm’s profit is given by the profit collected from all
customers who purchase, (mR +mO) [1− q0(SR, SO,mR,mO)], adjusted downward by
mOqO(SR, SO,mR,mO), to account for the customers who choose to purchase the
product without the optional component. Hence, it would seem that it is more
attractive for the firm to shift some of its margin from the optional component to the
required component so as to reduce the “loss” in profit due to customers who choose
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not to purchase the optional component. Owing to this property, at the optimal
solution, it is best to allocate zero margin to the optional component while making
money on the required component. The next proposition formalizes this observation.
Proposition 2. The unique optimal margin for the optional component is zero. The






The proposition indicates that all the variants of the optional component should
be priced at cost, where the cost includes not just the purchase cost cOj of the variant
j ∈ SO, but also the inventory-related cost γOj. Proposition 2 may contradict the
popular belief that firms make money on accessories, which correspond to optional
components in the context of this model. As discussed in the next chapter, the firm
will no longer price the optional component at cost when the optional component is
an impulse purchase.
2.4.2 Assortment Selection
This section explores the firm’s assortment selection problem, given that the firm
will price any chosen assortment optimally. In order to highlight the substantial effect
of optimal pricing on the assortment selection, consider first the example shown in
Table 2.1, where the prices are fixed exogenously. In this example it is optimal for the
firm to offer only variant 1 of the required component (R1). To see why R3 and O1
are not offered, notice that while the gross margin is positive for those two variants
(i.e., pR − cR > 0 and pO − cO > 0), the effective margin is negative for both of
them, due to the relatively high inventory-related cost (i.e., pR − cR − γR < 0 and
pO − cO − γO < 0). As for R2, it is not carried in the optimal assortment even
though its effective margin, pR − cR − γR, is positive. This is because offering R2




Variant 1 (R1) Variant 2 (R2) Variant 3 (R3) Variant 1 (O1)
Unit purchase cost, cnk 1 1 1.6 1.5
Unit inventory cost, γnk 0.428 0.4383 0.5775 0.8456
Total unit cost, cnk+γnk 1.4280 1.5775 2.0383 2.3456
Unit price, pnk 2 2 2 2
Expected utility, αnk 7 8.5 9 9
Included in the optimal
assortment?
Yes No No No
Table 2.1: Optimal assortment for a firm that does not price its assortment optimally.
In this example, αO = 3, α0 = 5.
when the prices are fixed exogenously, certain variants may be left out of the optimal
assortment due to inventory-related costs or due to concerns about the cannibalization
effect. However, as the following proposition states, once the firm is allowed to set its
prices optimally, it becomes optimal for the firm to offer all variants.
Proposition 3. Suppose the firm is currently offering assortment SR∪SO. The firm
is always better off after adding a new variant to the assortment SR ∪ SO.
When prices are set optimally, there is no longer any concern about a less prof-
itable variant cannibalizing the demand for a more profitable variant, because all
variants have the same effective margin and, thus, are equally profitable. Further-
more, the optimal prices will always more than cover the inventory-related costs and
no variant will be left out because of inventory costs. In summary, the concerns about
cannibalization and inventory-related costs, which limit the optimal assortment when
prices are fixed exogenously, do not play a role when the firm optimizes over prices.
Even when the firm is able to price its assortment optimally, in most (if not
all) cases the firm either faces constraints on the assortment size (e.g., shelf space
or warehouse space limitations) or incurs fixed costs for carrying a product (e.g.,
administrative costs of adding a product to the database, cost of putting the product
on the store and warehouse shelves, etc.) In the presence of such limiting factors, the
firm must choose which variants to offer. Next, assuming the existence of a limit on
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Number of Variants Allowed Assortment
Required Component Optional Component
1 {1} {}
2 {1, 2} {}
3 {1, 2} {1}
4 {1, 2, 3} {1}
5 {1, 2, 3} {1, 2}
6 {1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2}
Table 2.2: Optimal assortment for several different limits on the assortment size. In
this example, ηR = 7.1696, ηR = 7.1255, ηR = 6.5533, ηR = 6.5335,
ηO = 7.6492, ηO = 7.1544, ηO = 6.8725, ηO = 6.8235, α0 = 5, αO = 8.
the size of the optimal assortment, we explore how the firm decides what variant to
add.
Table 2.2 illustrates an example where there is a limit on how many variants the
firm can offer in its assortment. In this example, there are four potential variants
for each of the required and optional components and the variants are indexed in
decreasing order of surplus, that is, ηn ≥ ηn ≥ ηn ≥ ηn, n ∈ {R,O}. Notice from
the table that when the firm can offer only one variant, the firm offers variant 1
of the required component (R1), that is, the required component with the highest
surplus. As the firm is allowed to offer more variants, the firm first adds variant 2 of
the required component (R2), followed by variant 1 of the optional component (O1).
As the limit on the assortment size is relaxed further, R3 and O2 are added, in that
order.
One observation from this table is that whenever the firm adds one more variant
of the required component to the assortment, it adds the one with the highest surplus
among all remaining variants of the required component. Likewise, whenever the
firm adds a new variant of the optional component, it adds the one with the highest
surplus among all remaining variants of the optional component. To formalize this
observation, consider a firm who is planning to expand a given assortment by choosing
one variant from a set of candidates that all belong to the same component. The
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following proposition states that the firm will pick the variant with the largest unit
surplus.
Proposition 4. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Suppose that there is a set of
variants of component n, denoted by V , that may be added to the current assortment.
If the firm is allowed to add only one of these candidates, then the firm will add the
candidate with the highest surplus, i.e., the firm will add variant k such that ηnk ≥ ηnl
for all l ∈ V .
Because ηnk is the total surplus created by one unit of the variant exchanging
hands from the firm to the customer, a larger ηnk not only allows the firm to keep a
larger profit margin but also allows the firm to leave a higher surplus to the customer,
thereby increasing the customer’s purchase probability. Hence, the firm prefers to add
the variant k with the highest ηnk.
Given the component whose assortment is to be expanded, Proposition 4 describes
which variant to add. However, the proposition is silent about whether to expand
the required component’s assortment or the optional component’s assortment. For
instance, in the example shown in Table 2.2, if the firm is allowed to offer four variants
instead of three, why is it that the firm chooses to add R3 over O2? This decision
might be more surprising given that the surplus of O2 is higher than the surplus of
R3. The explanation lies in the new product configurations enabled by the addition
of R3 versus O2. It turns out that the new configurations enabled by the addition
of R3 (that is, R3 with no optional component and R3 with O1) are more profitable
for the firm than the new configurations enabled by the addition of O2 (that is, R1
with O2 and R2 with O2). Motivated by this observation, define the attraction of a
product configuration that combines variant i of the required component with variant
j of the optional component, denoted by a[ij]:
a[ij] := exp(ηRi + ηOj). (2.13)
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Proposition 5 uses this definition and provides a precise description of how a firm
chooses between a required component and an optional component.
Proposition 5. Suppose the firm is currently offering assortment SR ∪SO and must
decide whether to add variant i of the required component or variant j of the optional
component. The firm will add variant i of the required component if and only if the
total attraction of all product configurations that contain required component i exceeds
the total attraction of all product configurations that contain optional component j,





The lesson from Proposition 5 is that, when deciding whether to add a required
or an optional component, the firm must avoid making decisions solely on the basis
of the variants’ own surpluses, because the profitability of each candidate depends on
what variants it can be coupled with to create new product configurations.
2.4.3 Effect of Service Level, Demand Variability and Inventory Costs
Propositions 4 and 5 illustrate the importance of the surplus when deciding what
variants to include in the assortment. The surplus is affected not only by the cus-
tomer’s expected utility from the variant and the firm’s unit purchase cost, but also
the inventory-related parameters such as underage and overage costs, the demand’s
coefficient of variation, and the service level. Proposition 6 describes how the assort-
ment decisions depend on such inventory-related parameters.
Proposition 6. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Suppose that there are two variants
of component n, variants l and k, that may be added to the current assortment, but the
firm is allowed to add only one of these candidates. If the two variants are identical
in all respects, but:
(a) The demand’s coefficient of variation is larger for variant l than for variant k, i.e.
σnl > σnk, then the firm will add the variant with the lower coefficient of variation,
variant k.
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nk), then the firm will add the variant with the lower unit underage
(overage) cost, variant k.
(c) The service level is larger for variant l than variant k, i.e., znl > znk, then there is
a critical service level z such that if znk < znl < z, then the firm will add the variant
with the higher service level, variant l, and if z < znk < znl, then the firm will add
the variant with the lower service level, variant k.
The results in Proposition 6(a),(b) confirm the intuition that the higher the vari-
ant’s demand variability and the higher the variant’s unit underage and overage costs,
the more costly it is to carry that variant. Hence, the firm will add variants with lower
demand variability and lower underage and overage costs. It is evident from Proposi-
tion 6(c) that the effect of the service level is not as straightforward. A higher service
level does not necessarily increase a variant’s surplus. In fact, for each variant, there
is an optimal service level that balances overage and underage costs, and the further
the service level moves from this optimal level in either direction, the smaller the
variant’s surplus becomes. This observation explains the result stated in Proposition
6(c). If two variants have the same optimal service level and both variants’ service
levels exceed that optimal level, the firm would pick the variant with the lower service
level. Likewise, if both variants’ service levels are below the optimal level, then the
firm will pick the variant with the higher service level.
2.5. Additive Demand Model
In the base model in Section 2.3, randomness in demand is introduced using a
multiplicative perturbation of the expected demand. This section explores the pricing
and assortment decisions when randomness is introduced as an additive perturbation
of the expected demand.
Using the purchase probabilities qRi(SR, SO,pR,pO) and qOj(SR, SO,pR,pO), given
by (2.3) and (2.4), respectively, as the starting point to model the aggregate demand
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for a variant, the random demand for variant k of component n ∈ {R,O} is now given
by,
Dnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) ∼ qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) + εnk for k ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O},
where εnk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean 0 and standard deviation
σnk. Hence, the demand for variant k of component n ∈ {R,O} follows a normal
distribution with a mean of qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) and a standard deviation of σnk.
3







(pnk − cnk)qnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)− γnk
)]
, (2.14)








. Observe from (2.14) that the firm’s ex-
pected profit separates into two terms: The first term captures the gross profit (which
depends on prices) and the second term captures inventory-related costs (which do
not depend on prices). Consequently, the optimal prices do not depend on parame-
ters such as unit overage and underage costs, service levels and standard deviations
of demand. The following proposition characterizes the optimal prices.
Proposition 7. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Let mnk := pnk − cnk denote the





, all variants k of component n will have the same gross margin, i.e., mnk = mn







j∈SO exp(ηOj −mO) + exp(ηO)
]
3One drawback of the additive model is that, when σnk is sufficiently large, the probability of




:= αRi − cRi for i ∈ SR, ηOj := αOj − cOj for j ∈ SO and ηO := αO.
According to Proposition 7, the gross margin is the same across all variants of a
given component. This is markedly different from the result under the model with
multiplicative demand, where the effective margin was the same across all variants of
a given component. In the case of additive demand, the optimal prices are not affected
by parameters that drive inventory costs, namely, unit overage and underage costs,
service levels and standard deviations of demand. In contrast, under multiplicative
randomness, the optimal prices do depend on those parameters. In a more general
model that allows both additive and multiplicative randomness, one would expect that
the optimal prices will continue to depend on inventory-related parameters. Given
such general models pose significant analytical challenges, the purely additive and
purely multiplicative models are two compromises that achieve analytical tractability.
Of these two alternative models, the model with multiplicative demand appears to be
more advantageous in that it does capture the effect of inventory-related parameters
on the optimal prices, which the additive model fails to do.
Notice from Proposition 7 that one important insight from the model with multi-
plicative demand continues to hold under additive demand: the optional component is
sold at zero gross margin under additive demand; it was sold at zero effective margin
under multiplicative demand.
As for the assortment decision, observe from the profit expression, given by (2.14),
that the inventory costs captured in the form of γnk now play the role of a ‘fixed cost’
of carrying a variant. Hence, when deciding what items to offer, the firm will weigh
the item’s contribution to gross profit against the fixed cost of carrying the item. The
next proposition formalizes this observation.
Proposition 8. Suppose the firm is currently offering assortment SR ∪ SO. Let
m∗
R
(SR, SO) denote the optimal margin for the required component as defined by Propo-
sition 7. Given a new variant k of the required component, the firm will add variant k
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if and only if m∗
R
(SR∪{k}, SO)−m∗R(SR, SO) > γRk. Likewise, a new variant k of the
optional component will be added if and only if m∗
R
(SR, SO∪{k})−m∗R(SR, SO) > γOk.
Contrast Proposition 8 with its analog in the multiplicative case, Proposition 3.
In the model with multiplicative demand, the firm was always better off after adding
a new variant. In the model with additive demand, this is no longer true, because
the firm incurs a fixed cost, γnk, for adding variant k of component n, and there is
no guarantee that the gross profit from the item will cover its fixed costs. The ability
to incorporate fixed costs is an advantage of the additive demand, but if one wanted
to model fixed costs, it would not be hard to incorporate them to the model with
multiplicative demand either.
Proposition 8 deals with whether or not to add a variant. The next proposition, on
the other hand, describes how to pick from variants that are competing for inclusion
in the assortment.
Proposition 9. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Suppose that there is a set of
variants of component n, denoted by V , that may be added to the current assortment
and all candidates have the same inventory-related cost, γ, i.e. γnl = γ for all l ∈ V .
If the firm is allowed to add only one of these candidates, then the firm will add the
candidate with the highest αnl − cnl for all l ∈ V .
The above proposition provides an insight similar to that in Proposition 4, which
stated that, given a set of variants, V , that may be added to the assortment, the firm
should add the variant with the highest surplus, i.e., the variant that has the highest
αnl − cnl − γnl for all l ∈ V . For the additive demand case, Proposition 9 shows that
a special case of this result continues to hold: if all the variants have the same fixed




This chapter deals with a firm’s assortment and pricing decisions for configurable
products under demand uncertainty. A model for a configurable product as a com-
bination of a required component and an optional component is presented. In this
model, each component’s assortment allows the consumer to choose from several vari-
ants. The demands for the required and optional components are complementary in
the sense that expanding the assortment of one component, or decreasing its price,
will increase the demand for the other component. In this model, the customer de-
cides what product to purchase based on the entire assortment and prices for that
assortment.
This chapter finds that the optimal prices are such that all variants of a component
share the same effective profit margin (i.e., the selling price net of unit purchase cost
and unit inventory cost). In the absence of inventory costs, logit-type choice models
typically lead to optimal pricing rules that require the gross margins (selling price
net of unit purchase cost) to be equal (e.g., Besanko et al., 1998). However, in
practice, gross margins are rarely ever equal across variants. In fact, in many cases,
the gross margin is larger for higher quality variants. The results of this chapter
offer one possible explanation: What should be equal across variants is not the gross
margin, but the effective margin, which is the gross margin net of unit inventory
cost. Assuming that higher quality variants have higher overage and underage costs,
it would follow that such variants will also have higher gross margins. Furthermore,
these results may explain why some firms choose to charge a premium on variants
that are only artificially different from others in the same assortment. For example,
Dell’s XPS laptops come in one of two standard colors for the cover (black and red),
but one can purchase them in blue, white or pink covers by paying a premium.
One may argue that this is because Dell pays higher unit prices for such colors or
that customers are willing to pay higher prices for them. This chapter contains an
alternative explanation: Even if the color of the cover makes no discernible difference
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in terms of Dell’s purchase cost or customer’s willingness to pay, pink or white covers
would still command higher prices if their demand variability (measured in terms of
coefficient of variation) is larger than the standard colors.
As for assortment selection, the importance of a variant’s surplus is highlighted.
The surplus is a measure of the variant’s profitability that depends not only on the
customer’s utility from the variant, but also on the variant’s unit purchase cost, unit
underage and overage costs, service level and demand variability. The surplus com-
bines all these demand-side and supply-side parameters in one convenient package.
When choosing from two variants of a given component, the firm should pick the
one with the higher surplus. However, this chapter shows that when choosing from
two variants that belong to different components, it is not enough to compare the
variants’ surpluses. In such a case, one must take into account the complementarity
and must be mindful of how adding one variant to a component’s assortment will
influence the demand for the other component. Another measure is provided in this
chapter, product attractiveness, that serves well for this type of decision. The prod-
uct attractiveness measures the profitability of a product configuration that brings
together a variant of the required component and a variant of the optional component
(as opposed to surplus, which measures the profitability of a variant by itself). One
could choose from two variants that belong to different components by comparing the
product attractiveness of the new configurations that are enabled by the addition of
each variant.
In the base model, randomness in demand is introduced using a multiplicative
perturbation of the expected demand. The chapter also explores the pricing and
assortment decisions when the randomness is introduced as an additive perturbation.
The main difference between the additive and multiplicative models is that, under
additive randomness, the optimal pricing rule is to use the same gross margin for
all variants of a given component, as opposed to using the same effective margin.
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The inventory-related costs of a variant, on the other hand, boil down to a fixed cost
of carrying the variant, which depends on the variant’s unit underage and overage
costs, service level and demand variability. Hence, the optimal assortment selection




Assortment Selection and Pricing for Configurable Products:
Extensions and Generalizations
3.1. Introduction
This chapter explores three different extensions to the model presented in Chap-
ter II: First, it explores a model where the required component is the only driver of
store traffic. Second, it allows for a customer segment in the population that is inter-
ested in purchasing the optional component only. Third, it explores a generalization
where the components are complementary and can be functional when purchased sep-
arately. Throughout this chapter, the term base model refers to the model presented
in Chapter II Section 2.3.
The required and optional components may differ in their ability to draw store
traffic. For example, according to Johnson (2004), “Consumer Electronics Associa-
tion research shows that a consumer will decide where to buy the computer based on
advertised pricing, yet will have little or no point of reference for pricing on accessories
once they enter a store.” In Chapter II, it is assumed that customers take into account
the assortments and prices of both the required and optional components when mak-
ing their decision to purchase from the firm. However, this chapter explores a model
variation where the optional component, which could be labeled as an accessory, is
an impulse purchase. Such different modeling assumption allows a comparison, which
highlights the different roles played by the optional component in the optimal pricing
of configurable products. In Chapter II, where the customer’s decision to purchase
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from the firm depends on the prices and assortments of both the required and optional
components, the optimal effective margin is zero for the optional component, and the
firm makes money on the required component. In contrast, this chapter finds that
when the customer’s decision to purchase from the firm depends only on the required
component’s assortment and prices (e.g., when the optional component is an impulse
purchase), the optional component is now sold at a positive effective margin.
In Chapter II, it is assumed that a customer purchases the optional component
only if she purchases the required component. However, in a more general setting,
there may be customers shopping for the optional component only, maybe because
they bought the required component earlier and they would now like to purchase
the optional component as well. For example, a customer who bought a cell phone
at an earlier time may now be in the market to buy a carrying case. This chapter
presents a model where the firm will observe an additional segment of customers who
are interested in purchasing the optional component only (e.g. customers interested
in the cell phone case only). In such a setting, this chapter shows that the firm
will charge lower prices on the required component and higher prices on the optional
components compared to the setting described in Chapter II. Moreover, the firm
will be better off if it is able to price discriminate between those customers who are
purchasing the optional component only and those customers who are purchasing the
optional component in addition to the required component.
One of the important contributions of Chapter II is the structure of the pricing
policy namely, the optimality of using the same effective margin for all variants of a
component. In this chapter it is demonstrated that the same structure holds when
the model is generalized so that both components are optional (instead of one of them
being required).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2, modifies the model in
Chapter II to explore the case where the optional component is an impulse purchase.
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Section 3.3 builds on the model presented in the previous chapter to allow for a
new customer segment: One interested in purchasing only the optional component.
Section 3.4 presents a generalization of the model in Chapter II. The concluding
remarks are presented in Section 3.5. The proofs are included in Appendix B.
3.2. The Optional Component as an Impulse Purchase
In Chapter II, the customer chooses a configuration based on the assortment
and prices of both the required and optional components. This chapter explores an
extension where the customer’s decision to purchase from the firm is based on only
the assortment and prices of the required component. Only if the customer decides
to purchase the required component, will he assess the price and assortment of the
optional component and choose what variant of the optional component to purchase,
if any. This captures a scenario where customers buy the optional component on
impulse, which is likely to be the case when, for example, customers learn about the
accessories of a product only after arriving at the store.
In keeping with the notation of the previous chapter, let SR denote the set of
variants for the required component and SO the set of variants for the optional com-
ponent. In addition, let pRi and pOj denote the price of required component’s variant
i ∈ SR and the price of optional component’s variant j ∈ SO, respectively.
First, the customer makes the utility-maximizing choice from the variants of the
required component, including the choice of not purchasing at all. Let α̂0 be the
customer’s expected utility of not purchasing from the firm. Let q̂Rk(SR,pR) denote the
probability that a customer decides to purchase variant k of the required component
and q̂0(SR,pR) the probability that the customer chooses not to purchase. Following
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i∈SR exp(αRi − pRi)





i∈SR exp(αRi − pRi)
. (3.2)
The aggregate random demand for variant k is now modeled as the purchase proba-
bility multiplied by a random error term:
DRk(SR,pR) = q̂Rk(SR,pR)εRk,
where εRk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σRk.
As for the optional component, recall that the customer purchases it only if he
has already bought a variant of the required component. Therefore, the probability
that a customer purchases variant k of the optional component is the probability
that the customer purchases a variant of the required component, multiplied by the
probability that variant k ∈ SO is the customer’s utility-maximizing choice among all
variants of the optional component, i.e., for k ∈ SO:
q̂Ok(SR, SO,pR,pO) =[ ∑
i∈SR exp(αRi − pRi)
exp(α̂0) +
∑





j∈SO exp(αOj − pOj)
. (3.3)
Then, the aggregate random demand for variant k of the optional component is
DOk(SR, SO,pR,pO) = q̂Ok(SR, SO,pR,pO)εOk,
where εOk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σOk.
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Given this new demand model, one could follow the same steps as in the previous
section to show that the firm’s expected profit (revenue minus purchase costs minus
overage and underage costs), denoted by Π̂(SR, SO,pR,pO), simplifies to:
Π̂(SR, SO,pR,pO) =∑
k∈SR
(pRk − cRk − γRk)q̂Rk(SR,pR) +
∑
k∈SO
(pOk − cOk − γOk)q̂Ok(SR, SO,pR,pO). (3.4)
Next we explore the firm’s pricing decisions under a given assortment, SR∪SO. As
the following proposition states, the optimal solution continues to exhibit the equal
effective margin property as defined in the previous chapter.
Proposition 10. Given an assortment SR∪SO, the optimal pricing policy is such that
all variants of a given component n ∈ {R,O} have the same effective margin. The







Given the optimal value of mO, the optimal effective margin for the required component











Notice from the proposition that the optimal margin for the optional component
is no longer zero, unlike the result in Proposition 2. In fact, the optimal margin
prescribed for the optional component is the margin that optimizes the firm’s profit
from a customer who is already at the store and is now deciding what variant of the
optional component to purchase, if any.
As for the required component, it is interesting to observe that the firm may now
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Assortment
Required Component Optional Component
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1 Variant 2
η (approx.) 3.4294 3.4294 6.7860 7.7860
margins −1.5731 5.5780
Table 3.1: When the optional component is an impulse purchase, the required com-
ponent’s margin may be negative at optimality. Parameters: αO = 1,
α̂0 = 5.
choose to sell it at a loss. Such an example is provided in Table 3.1. In this example,
the optional component is very lucrative for the firm, because the expected surpluses
of the optional components are much higher than those of the required components,
giving the firm more room for higher margins on the optional components. Now that
the optional component is so lucrative, the firm sells the required component at a loss
in a bid to attract more customers and to drive even more demand toward the optional
component. The firm chooses to do so even though selling the required component
at a loss means that the firm will lose money on the customers who eventually decide
not to purchase the optional component. This type of setting where the optional
component is the profit driver is not uncommon. For example, it is reported that
motorcycle dealers in the UK are selling the bikes themselves at small gross margins,
but they are driving up their profits by carrying accessories, alarm systems, protective
gear and apparel, which are “far more lucrative” with “far higher” profit margins than
selling or servicing vehicles.1
Next, we explore the firm’s assortment selection problem given that the firm will
price any chosen assortment optimally. As before, in the absence of any constraints
on the size of the assortment, the firm would be better off by offering all possible
variants. When the firm has to choose between two variants of the same component,
the same decision rule as in the base model (in Chapter II) applies: Add the variant
1AM-online.com, “Motorcycles Accessories: Dealers make the most of those little extras,” July
8, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.am-online.com/law/story/?nID=42897361 on September 25,
2008.
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Current Assortment Available Variants to Add




Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant A Variant B
η 5.5720 4.1544 2.5720 1.6544 1.9772 1.5772
Table 3.2: In this example the firm would add Variant B, an optional component,
under the base model, but switches to Variant A, a required component,
when the optional component is an impulse purchase. Parameters: α̂0 = 1,
and αO = 2.
with the higher surplus, as stated in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Suppose the firm faces the problem described in Section 3.2, that
is, the firm’s expected profit is Π̂(SR, SO,pR,pO), given by (3.4). Consider component
n ∈ {R,O}. Suppose that there is a set of variants of component n, denoted by V ,
that may be added to the current assortment. If the firm is allowed to add only one
of these candidates, then the firm will add the candidate with the highest surplus, i.e.,
the firm will add variant k such that ηnk ≥ ηnl for all l ∈ V .
In other words, Proposition 4 continues to hold in the case where the optional
component is an impulse purchase. When the firm has to choose between a variant
of the required component and a variant of the optional component, the decision
rule that was optimal in the base model (see Proposition 5) is no longer optimal.
For instance, in the example shown in Table 3.2, the firm is currently offering an
assortment with two variants each of the required and the optional component. When
choosing between Variant A of the required component and Variant B of the optional
component, this firm would add Variant B under the base model, because the total
attraction of the product configurations that are enabled by Variant B is larger.
However, the firm switches to Variant A when the optional component is an impulse
purchase, because of the asymmetry that now exists between the optional and required
components: The required component contributes to the probability of a customer
purchasing from the firm, but the optional component does not. Hence, the required
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component gains an edge that makes it more desirable even when the total product
attraction favors the optional component.
3.3. Customers Purchasing the Optional Component Only
The model considered in this section allows a segment of customers that are shop-
ping for the optional component exclusively. This is likely to be the case, for example,
when the purchase of the optional component is separated in time from the purchase
of the required component.
Let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of customers that are shopping for both the
required and optional components (indexed as segment 1) and 1 − β the fraction
of customers that are shopping for the optional component exclusively (indexed as
segment 2). The entire demand for the required component originates from segment
1. For an individual who belongs to segment 1, the decision model is the one described
in the base model. Therefore, the probability that a segment-1 customer purchases
variant k of the required component is qRk(SR, SO,pR,pO). Given that an individual
belongs to segment-1 with probability β, the stochastic, aggregate demand for variant
k of the required component, DRk(SR, SO,pR,pO), is:
DRk(SR, SO,pR,pO) = βqRk(SR, SO,pR,pO)εRk,
where εRk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σRk. Notice that the change from the previous chapter’s model is that the demand
for a required component is now a fraction β of what it used to be, reflecting the
fact that only a fraction β of the consumer population is shopping for the required
component.
The demand for variant k of the optional component originates from both seg-
ments. A segment-1 customer purchases variant k of the optional component with
probability qOk(SR, SO,pR,pO). On the other hand, an individual who belongs to seg-
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ment 2 decides whether or not to purchase from the firm on the basis of the assortment
and prices of the optional component only (without any regard to the prices and as-
sortment of the required component). Letting α̃0 denote the expected utility of an
exogenous alternative for customers only interested in the optional component (i.e.,
the expected utility of not purchasing from the firm), the MNL choice model yields the
following expression for the probability that a segment-2 customer purchases variant





k∈SO exp(αOk − pOk)
. (3.5)
Weighing the purchase probabilities, qOk(SR, SO,pR,pO) and q̃Ok(SO,pO), with the
fractions of segments 1 and 2, β and 1− β, respectively, a randomly chosen customer
purchases variant k of the optional component with probability
βqOk(SR, SO,pR,pO) + (1− β)q̃Ok(SO,pO).
Once again, we use a multiplicative error term to model stochastic, aggregate demand
for variant k of the optional component, denoted by DOk(SR, SO,pR,pO):
DOk(SR, SO,pR,pO) =
(
βqOk(SR, SO,pR,pO) + (1− β)q̃Ok(SO,pO)
)
εOk,
where εOk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σOk.










(pOk − cOk − γOk)q̃Ok(SO,pO). (3.6)
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The following proposition states that any optimal price vector must satisfy the equal
effective margin property as was the case in the previous chapter.
Proposition 12. The optimal prices must satisfy first-order-conditions of the firm’s
expected profit, Π̃(SR, SO,pR,pO), and are such that, for a given component n ∈
{R,O}, all variants k of component n will have the same effective profit margin,
i.e., mnk := pnk − cnk − γnk = mn for all k ∈ Sn.
Using the property in Proposition 12 we rewrite the firm’s profit function, given
by (3.6), as a function of the margins, denoted by mR and mO, instead of a function




















exp(ηOk−mO) . The profit function in (3.7) is not well
behaved in that there may exist multiple margin pairs that satisfy the first-order
conditions. In other words, the first-order conditions are not sufficient for optimality.
See Figure 3.1 for a numerical example with two local maxima.
Even though the profit function is not necessarily well-behaved, it is still tractable
enough to obtain a number of comparisons with the model considered in Chapter II.
The following proposition describes important properties of the optimal margins for
the optional and required components.
Proposition 13. For any given assortment, SR ∪ SO, the optimal margin for the
optional component, mO, is always strictly positive. On the other hand, the optimal
margin for the required component may be negative.
In the model where the optional component was bought only as part of a product


























Local Maxima Global Maxima
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 3.1: The firm’s expected profit as a function of the two margins, mR and mO.
This example shows that the profit function may have multiple stationary
points, each of which is a local optimum. Hence, the first order conditions
are not sufficient for optimality. Parameters: β = 0.9, αO = 8, α0 = 5,
α̃0 = 2, ηR = 8.57, ηR = 7.57, ηO = 8.57 and ηO = 7.57.
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Assortment
Required Component Optional Component
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1 Variant 2
η (approx.) 2.15 2.15 8.78 9.28
margins −0.3829 7.6483
Table 3.3: When there is a segment of customers shopping for the optional compo-
nent only, the required component’s margin may be negative at optimality.
Parameters: β = 0.1, αO = 2, α0 = 5 and α̃0 = 1.
is a segment of customers that are shopping for the optional component only (segment
2), this is no longer the case: The firm would like to charge a positive margin on the
optional component to make money from segment-2 customers.
The firm may choose to sell the required component at a loss. Such an example
is provided in Table 3.3. In this example, the optional component is very lucrative
for the firm, not only because the expected surpluses of the optional components
are much higher than those of the required components, but also because segment 2,
which consists of customers shopping only for the optional component, is very large
(90% of the population) compared to segment 1. Therefore, the firm sells the required
component at a loss so as to drive more demand toward the optional component.
The behavior shown in Table 3.3 is an especially colorful example of a more
general behavior: The existence of segment 2 drives up the margin for the optional
component, compared to the model considered in Chapter II. Thus, the firm now
wishes to sell more of the optional component, which can be achieved by slightly
reducing the margin of the required component compared to what it was under the
base model. The next proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 14. For a given assortment, SR∪SO, when there is a segment shopping
for the optional component only, the optimal margin for the required component is
lower than that in the base model.
In the presence of two segments, the firm would benefit from price discriminating
between the two segments, if it were possible. In particular, given that segment 1
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customers exhibit the same behavior as those under the model with only segment-1
customers, the firm would like to sell the optional component at cost to segment
1, but it would like to charge a positive margin on the optional component when
selling it to segment-2 customers. Such price discrimination can be implemented by
offering discounts on the optional component to customers who also buy the required
component. This type of price discrimination is common in practice. For example, in
June 2008, Best Buy was offering a discount on printers (optional component) with
the purchase of a personal computer (required component).
Next, consider the assortment selection of a firm in the presence of two segments.
Under the base model, given two variants of the same component, the firm always
chooses to add the one with the higher expected surplus (see Proposition 4). The
same result is expected to hold when there are two segments. Even though numerical
experiments suggest this to be the case, the result is not easy to prove due to the com-
plicated nature of the pricing problem for a given assortment. In addition, under the
model with only segment-1, given one variant of each component, the firm chooses to
add the variant that has a higher total attraction across the product configurations
that it enables (see Proposition 5). This is no longer true under the two-segment
model. Consider the numerical example in Table 3.4. In this example, the firm can
add either variant A, a required component, or variant B, an optional component.
Even though the total product attraction (as defined in Proposition 5) favors vari-
ant A of the required component, the firm is better off by adding variant B of the
optional component. This is not surprising, because adding another variant of the
required component is not going to improve the profits from the second segment who
is shopping for the optional component only.
3.4. Generalization to an assortment with two complementary compo-
nents
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Current Assortment Available Variants to Add




Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant A Variant B
η 3.4294 3.4294 4.5720 4.5720 5.577 6.577
Table 3.4: In this example the firm would add Variant A, a required component, but
switches to Variant B, an optional component, when there is a segment
shopping for the optional component only. Parameters: β = 0.5, α0 = 1,
α̃0 = 2 and αO0 = 1.
Chapter II considers a product formed by putting together a required and an op-
tional component. This section presents a more generalized problem where a product
is a combination of two complementary components that can be purchased separately
from each other. In other words, there is no required component in this model; the
customer chooses whether or not to purchase each component. In such a setting the













for i ∈ SR∪{0}, j ∈ SO∪{0}, where v[0j] := exp(αR +αOj−pOj) and αR is the utility
contribution of the not purchasing the required component. Likewise the probability












The probability that a customer chooses variant i of the required component, de-
noted by qRi, is then given by the sum of the probabilities that a customer chooses a
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q[ij](SR, SO,pR,pO), i ∈ SR. (3.10)
Similarly, the probability that a customer chooses variant j of the optional component,





i∈SR∪{0} q[ij](SR, SO,pR,pO), j ∈ SO. (3.11)
We use the purchase probabilities in (3.10) and (3.11) as the starting point to model
the aggregate demand for a variant. Specifically, it is assumed that the aggregate, ran-
dom demand for variant k of component n = {R,O}, denoted by DGnk(SR, SO,pR,pO),
is given by
DGnk(SR, SO,pR,pO) ∼ qGnk(SR, SO,pR,pO)εnk for k ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O},
where εnk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σnk. The firm’s profit function is similar to that in the previous chapter (see (2.8))








(pnk − cnk − γnk)qGnk(SR, SO,pR,pO). (3.12)
We next analyze the pricing problem given an assortment of variants.
The following proposition states that the equal effective margin property continues
to hold.
Proposition 15. Consider component n ∈ {R,O}. Let mnk := pnk−cnk−γnk denote





, all variants k of component n will have the same effective profit
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margin, i.e., mnk = mn for all k ∈ Sn.
Proposition 15 reduces the pricing decision to only two margins. In contrast to
the previous chapter, in this generalized version both components are now sold at
positive margin.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter extends Chapter II by exploring alternative models and generaliza-
tions. Here three alternative scenarios are presented and the optimal pricing and
assortment policies are explored for a two-category assortment under demand uncer-
tainty.
In Chapter II, the customer decides what product to purchase based on the en-
tire assortment and prices. This chapter studies an extension where the customer’s
decision to purchase from the firm depends solely on the required component’s as-
sortment and prices, thereby rendering the optional component an impulse purchase.
In the model where the customer’s decision to purchase from the firm depends on the
prices and assortments of both the required and optional components (Chapter II),
the optimal effective margin is zero for the optional component, and the firm makes
money on the required component. In contrast, when the customer’s decision to pur-
chase from the firm depends only on the required component’s assortment and prices
(e.g., when the optional component is an impulse purchase), the optional component
is now sold at a positive effective margin. In such a case, if the optional component is
lucrative enough, the firm may even choose to sell the required component at a loss
so as to drive more demand toward the optional component. Therefore, when selling
configurable products, the firm’s optimal pricing strategy depends very much on how
the firm is marketing the optional component.
In another model variation presented in this chapter, a new customer segment
is added to the customer population described in Chapter II. This new customer
segment is assumed to be shopping only for the optional component. When such a
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segment exists, the optional component is sold at a positive effective margin. However,
the firm would ideally sell the optional component at zero effective margin to the
segment that is shopping for both components. This suggests that the firm could
benefit from a price discrimination strategy where all customers who purchase the
required component receive a discount on the optional component.
The motivation of Chapter II was to model the configurable nature of some prod-
ucts. In such a case, the definition of two distinct types of components (i.e. required
and optional components) was useful. However, this chapter explores an alternative
formulation that removes this distinction and allows the customer to purchase or not
to purchase either component. Under this generalized model, this chapter finds that
the optimal pricing rule is the same as before: All variants within the same category
should be priced so that all have the same “equal effective margin”.
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Chapter IV
Assortment Selection and Pricing in the presence of Dual
Sales Channels
4.1. Introduction
The previous two chapters studied assortment selection and pricing problems faced
by a single seller. In a supply chain setting, the pricing of an assortment is a critical
decision not only for the seller itself, but also for its supplier. This pricing question
becomes even more critical in supply chains where the manufacturer is both a supplier
to and competitor of the retailer. Take the relationship between Sony and Best
Buy as an example; specifically the Sony VAIO BZ560 line of laptop computers.
SonyStyle.com sells, at the bare minimum, 45 different configurations for the Sony
VAIO BZ560 computer. In contrast, Best Buy offers the customer only one VAIO
BZ560 configuration. Motivated by such channel relationships, in this chapter we
consider the pricing and assortment selection problems that arise in a supply chain
where the manufacturer uses dual channels.
The marketing literature suggests that a store’s assortment is almost as important
as its price profile and location in driving the store traffic, see, for example, Zhang et
al. (2009) and the references therein. Hence, in this chapter, we model the customer’s
choice of channel as a function of the assortment and prices offered by both channels.
In particular, we use the nested logit model to capture the consumer choice: The
customer first chooses the channel she wants to purchase from (if any) and, subse-
quently, decides which product to purchase from her chosen channel. This demand
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model allows us to account for the effect of both channels’ assortments and prices on
the demand observed by each channel.
There are several assumptions one can make regarding who carries inventory in
this dual-channel structure and where. In keeping with the motivating example,
this chapter considers a manufacturer (e.g. Sony) who sells a build-to-order product
through its direct channel while meeting the orders from the retailer. As for the
retailer (e.g. Best Buy), it is assumed that it keeps inventory of the final (assembled)
products and meets the observed demand with this inventory. Because the retailer
must make stock level decisions before observing the customer demand, there exists
the possibility of demand-inventory mismatch at the retailer. Hence, the model ac-
counts for the inventory-related costs associated with the demand-inventory mismatch
at the retailer. In the case where the demand at the retailer exceeds the inventory
level, the retailer is allowed to procure additional products from the manufacturer.
For example, if the demand of a specific VAIO BZ560 computer is greater than the
amount Best Buy had in stock, then Best Buy could order additional units from Sony
to meet the excess demand.
A strength of this model is that it allows us to analyze the effect of inventory-
related costs on the pricing decisions. The selling prices charged by the manufacturer’s
direct channel and the retailer follow an equal effective margin property similar to
that described in Chapter II. In addition, this chapter characterizes the optimal
wholesale prices that the manufacturer charges to the retailer. For example, we find
that, everything else being equal, the manufacturer will charge lower wholesale prices
for variants with larger demand variability.
This setting where the manufacturer is able to sell through two channels, can be
used to study if the manufacturer benefits from selling through two separate channels.
In practice one can find both success and failure stories about engaging in dual (or
hybrid) sales channel strategies. For example, although Dell has been very successful
54
selling directly to customers, in 2006 they saw their profits and market share de-
cline significantly. The reaction to this decline came in 2007, when Dell successfully
embraced a hybrid strategy by adding resellers to their channel mix.1 In contrast,
by 2008, Gateway, another computer business, moved from engaging in dual sales
channels to only selling indirectly to customers.2 Inspired by these examples, in this
chapter we investigate the benefits of engaging in dual-sales channels.
For a build-to-order manufacturer and a retailer engaging in dual sales channels,
another relevant question is what assortment to offer through the retailer. More often
than not, the retailer offers only a subset of what the manufacturer’s direct channel
offers as indicated by the Sony VAIO example discussed earlier. Depending on the
power structure in the supply chain, the retailer’s assortment can be decided by the
retailer itself or it could be dictated by the manufacturer. We study both options.
Moreover, we study different sequences of decision-making that allow various scenarios
regarding the timing of assortment and pricing decisions.
We first explore problems where there is no fixed cost for offering a product variant
and there is no capacity limitation on the number of variants to carry. In such cases,
we find that if the manufacturer’s pricing decisions precede the retailer’s assortment
selection, both the retailer and the manufacturer will be best off by offering every
available product. However, if the retailer’s assortment selection precedes the manu-
facturer’s pricing decisions, then the retailer may strategically leave certain variants
out of its assortment.
The chapter also studies cases where there is a fixed cost for carrying a variant
or where there is a limit on the size of the assortment. When there is a limit on the
1Kellogg Insight: Focus on Research, A new strategy for Dell. Retrieved from http://insight.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/index.php/Kellogg/article/a_new_channel_strategy_for_dell
on 9/29/2009.
2Betanews.com, End of an era: Gateway stops selling PCs di-




size of the retailer’s assortment, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer may
disagree about which product to sell through the retailer, because the manufacturer
prefers products with higher demand variability while the retailer prefers products
with lower demand variability. When both the manufacturer and the retailer incur a
fixed cost for offering a product through the retailer, we find that the manufacturer’s
preferred assortment is larger than the retailer’s, even when the manufacturer’s fixed
cost per product is slightly higher.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the following section we re-
view the related literature. Section 4.3 describes the model. The pricing problem is
analyzed in Section 4.4 and the benefit of adding an indirect channel is analyzed in
Section 4.5. In Section 4.6 we explore the assortment decisions. Finally, Section 4.7
summarizes the results and contributions. The proofs are included in Appendix C.
4.2. Literature Review
The analysis of distribution systems has received considerable attention in the
operations and marketing literature. In the context of the broad literature on distri-
bution systems, the problem studied in this chapter belongs to the subset that deals
with multiple-channel distribution systems, in which a supplier sells through more
than one channel. Cattani et al. (2004) present a recent and extensive literature
survey on the coordination of multiple channels.
The multiple-channel distribution system studied in this chapter belongs to the
narrower subset of dual-channel systems, in which the supplier sells through two
channels only. The interest in dual channel systems (which have also been labeled
as “hybrid distribution”) dates back to as early as 1965 (Preston and Schramm,
1965). However, the interest in dual-channel systems has been revived in recent years
due to the tradeoffs presented by e-commerce. Agatz et al. (2008), Swaminathan
and Tayur (2003) and Tsay and Agrawal (2004) review the literature dealing with
multiple-channels that arise in the e-business setting.
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One could separate between two streams of work on the dual-channel distribu-
tion systems. The first stream of work deals with questions surrounding how much
to stock and where to keep that stock in the distribution system, see for example
Boyaci (2005), Alptekinoğlu and Tang (2005), Chiang and Monahan (2005), Moin-
zadeh (2003) and Seifert et al. (2006). Another example is Zhao (2008), which adds
the pricing problem to the inventory decision. In commonality with this work, this
chapter takes into consideration inventory costs of the products offered. However, we
simplify the inventory aspect of the problem by assuming that the inventory levels
are chosen to satisfy an exogenously fixed service level and the only stock-keeping
location is the retailer. These assumptions are in line with our motivating examples,
which revolve around build-to-order manufacturers adding a retailer to their channel
mix.
The second stream of work in dual-channel systems deals with how the prices
should be set and/or coordinated in this distribution system., e.g. Cattani et al.
(2006), Chiang and Chhajed (2005), Kumar and Ruan (2006) and Rhee and Park
(2000). This chapter is related to this second stream of research in that we study,
among other things, the pricing decisions in a dual-channel system. Earlier work that
is particularly related to the type of pricing problems that arise in this chapter are
Chiang et al. (2003) and Tsay and Agrawal (2004), who treat the manufacturer’s
channel structure as a decision variable, i.e., manufacturer decides whether or not
to use a dual-sales channel. They study the effects of the channel structure on the
pricing strategies and profits. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) build on Chiang et al. (2003)
by incorporating sales effort and the unit cost of supplying an item; however, they
restrict the selling prices to be the same in both channels. This chapter differs from
Chiang et al. (2003) and Tsay and Agrawal (2004) in a number of ways. In particular,
this chapter incorporates demand uncertainty and explicitly models the inventory
costs associated with demand-stock mismatches at the retailer.
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This chapter also addresses the question of whether it is always beneficial to sell
through dual-channels. There has been some work on the question of channel design,
especially when considering the distribution costs, e.g. Rangan (1987) and Chiang
et al. (2003). In our case, we do not explicitly model distribution costs but we
incorporate inventory costs and compare the expected profits for the manufacturer
under both scenarios.
What separates this chapter from all the work that came before it is that we model
a dual-channel system in which each channel sells an assortment of substitutable
products, and we analyze the assortment decisions.
4.3. Model Description
Consider a product that can be purchased through two channels: directly from
the manufacturer and through an independent retailer. Take a Dell Inspiron desktop
computer as an example: A customer can purchase a Dell Inspiron computer directly
from Dell.com (the manufacturer’s direct channel) where the customer configures the
computer by choosing from at least 2 models, 8 colors, 7 processors, 3 operating sys-
tems, 5 memory choices, 5 hard drive capacities (at least 8,400 different variants of
the Inspiron). On the other hand, the customer may choose to purchase a Dell Insp-
iron from Best Buy (retailer) by choosing from five different pre-configured Inspiron
computers. Notice that Best Buy is offering a subset of the variants that could be
purchased from Dell.com. In keeping with this scenario, we model a build-to-order
manufacturer, who offers an assortment of all possible variants; we denote this set of
variants with SM . The retailer in our model, on the other hand, offers a subset of
the variants in SM and keeps stock of the variants it carries. Let SR denote the set
of variants carried by the retailer.
In our model, the pricing decisions available to the manufacturer are the prices for
the direct channel, pMk for variant k ∈ SM (i.e. prices charged to the customers who
purchase from the manufacturer), and the wholesale price charged to the retailer, wk
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for variant k ∈ SR. On the other hand, the retailer chooses the price it charges to its
customers. Let pRk denote the retailer’s selling price for variant k ∈ SR.
4.3.1 Customer Demand Model
Consider an individual customer. We model the individual customer’s decision
building on the nested-logit model. In the nested-logit model the customer choice is
modeled as a sequential process, where the customer first chooses one of many ‘nests’
of items and, conditional on the choice of the nest, the customer chooses what specific
item to purchase from the nest. The choices in each stage follow a multinomial logit
choice model (MNL). The nested logit model leads to a closed form expression for the
probability that a customer purchases a specific item in a given nest. For more on the
nested-logit model see Anderson and de Palma (1992). In our model, the nests are
the manufacturer’s assortment, the retailer’s assortment and an external alternative.
If the customer decides to purchase from the manufacturer or the retailer, then she
decides on the specific product to purchase. For the sake of exposition, we first
describe the customer’s variant choice given that the customer already decided what
channel to purchase from (the retailer or the manufacturer’s direct channel).
4.3.1.1 Deciding what variant to purchase
In this stage, the customer chooses which variant to purchase from the assortment
offered by the channel she chose in the first stage. Consider an individual customer
who decided to purchase from channel n ∈ {M,R}, where n = M refers to the
manufacturer’s direct channel and n = R refers to the retailer. Let pn denote the
vector of prices for the variants offered by channel n.3 In keeping with the nested logit
choice model, we model the customer’s choice of variant using the multinomial logit
(MNL) choice model. (For details on the MNL model, see, for example, Ben-Akiva
3As a notational convention; we use bold symbols to denote vectors, e.g. pn is the vector of prices
charged by channel n to its customers.
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and Lerman, 1985.) Let Unk denote the customer’s utility from the variant k ∈ Sn.
Following the MNL model, Unk is given by
Unk = αk − pnk + ξnk , for k ∈ Sn, n ∈ {M,R},
where αk is the customer’s expected utility from variant k ∈ Sn, pnk is the price of
variant k in channel n and ξnk is a random error term with a Gumbel distribution with
mean zero and scale parameter µ2 > 0. The scale parameter µ2 can be interpreted as
the degree of heterogeneity across the variants offered by a given channel; when µ2
is close to zero the variants become perfect substitutes. In this setting, the customer
chooses the variant that maximizes his utility and the probability that the customer













k) := exp([αk − pnk ]/µ2) for k ∈ Sn. (4.2)
4.3.1.2 Channel choice
Let UM and UR denote the customer’s random utility of purchasing from the
manufacturer and from the retailer, respectively. The nested logit model posits that
the utility of purchasing from a nest is the expected utility of the utility-maximizing
choice in that nest plus a Gumbel error term. Hence, following the nested logit
model, Un := E [maxk U
n
k ] + ξn for n = R,M where ξn is a Gumbel random term
with mean zero and scale parameter µ1, where µ1 > 0. The parameter µ1, in contrast
to µ2, represents the heterogeneity of assortments across the two channels. Hence, we
expect that µ1 > µ2. Given that U
n
k ’s are Gumbel random variables (refer to Section
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4.3.1.1) and the Gumbel distribution is closed under maximization, maxk U
n
k is again
Gumbel, and its expected value is,














Similarly, let U0 denote the random utility of an external alternative. Here, U0 can
be thought of as the aggregate utility from a number of choices exogenous to our
model, such as the utility from purchasing the product from an alternate firm or the
utility from purchasing a different product altogether. This utility of the external
alternative, U0, is itself Gumbel with a mean of α0µ1.
The nested logit model then yields the following expression for the probability
that the customer purchases from channel n, denoted by τn(SM , SR,pM,pR):
τn(SM , SR,pM,pR) =
exp(E[Un]/µ1)
exp(E [U0] /µ1) + exp(E [UR] /µ1) + exp(E[UM ]/µ1)
for n ∈ {M,R}. Using (4.3) to substitute for E[Un] in the above equation, we obtain:











]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SM vk(pMk )]µ2/µ1 . (4.4)
4.3.1.3 The Aggregate Demand
According to the model we have described so far, an individual customer pur-
chases from the channel n ∈ {M,R} with probability τn(SM , SR,pM,pR) and chooses
variant k ∈ Sn with probability qnk (Sn,pn). Thus, the probability that an individual
purchases variant k from channel n is
τn(SM , SR,pM,pR)qnk (S
n,pn).
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We use the probability above as the starting point to model the aggregate demand for
a product. Specifically, we assume that the aggregate demand observed by channel n
for product k, denoted by Dnk (S
M , SR,pM,pR), is
Dnk (S
M , SR,pM,pR) ∼ τn(SM , SR,pM,pR)qnk (Sn,pn)εk for k ∈ Sn,
where εk’s are i.i.d normal random variables with mean one and standard deviation
σk. Notice that σk amounts to the coefficient of variation of customer’s demand for
variant k ∈ Sn.
4.3.2 The Firms’ Profit Functions
We treat the manufacturer’s assortment as fixed and hence we drop SM from the
argument lists of the functions. On the other hand, we treat the retailer’s assortment,
SR, as a decision variable. This modeling choice is aligned with our motivating
example, in which the manufacturer offers all possible variants while the retailer
offers only a subset of them. We consider both the case where the retailer chooses its
own assortment, and the case where the manufacturer decides what to offer through
the retailer.
We assume that the manufacturer has two pricing decisions to make: the direct
channel prices, pMk , and the wholesale price for each variant, denoted by wk for k ∈ SR.
The retailer, on the other hand, needs to determine its own selling prices, pRk for
variant k ∈ SR. We consider several scenarios regarding the sequencing of decisions,
including the pricing decisions and the assortment decision. For the sake of exposition,
we next describe the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profit functions given the prices
and assortments and delay an explanation of the sequence of events until the next
section.
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4.3.2.1 Retailer’s Expected Profit
We consider a one-period problem. Recall that we model a make-to-stock retailer
who procures the finished product from the manufacturer and faces random demand.
Hence, inventory decisions at the retailer are taken into account and we assume these
decisions are made after all pricing and assortment decisions have been made by both
the manufacturer and retailer.
Let yk denote the retailer’s stock level of variant k ∈ SR. We assume that the
retailer will stock yk units at the beginning of the period to satisfy a type-1 service level
objective, which, as in previous chapters, is uniquely determined by the exogenously








R,pM,pR) denote the mean and standard deviation of
the demand for variant k observed by the retailer.
At the beginning of the period, the retailer places the orders, yk’s, with the man-
ufacturer. Next, the demand at the retailer, DRk (S
R,pM,pR) for k ∈ SR, is realized.
For each variant, two outcomes may arise in this setting for the retailer: either the
variant’s stock is sufficient to meet the demand or not. In the former case, the retailer
incurs a cost cok for each unit of leftover inventory. In the latter case, we assume
that the retailer places an additional order with the manufacturer to meet the excess
demand, at a unit cost cuk, which is in addition to the wholesale price. The cost cuk
may be interpreted as the additional cost associated with expediting a shipment in



























Here, the function LRk (S
R,pM,pR) represents the expected overage and underage cost
associated with variant k ∈ SR . Following the same approach as in Section 2.3.3,





 (pRk − wk)qRk(SR,pR)
− σk
[





Let us define γk := σk
[
cokzk + (cok + cuk)IN(zk)
]
. Notice that γk works as a unit cost
incurred by the retailer and it depends only on unit overage cost, cok, unit underage
cost, cuk, the demand’s coefficient of variation, σk, and the service level zk. Using




(pRk − wk − γk)qRk(SR,pR). (4.8)
4.3.2.2 Manufacturer’s Expected Profit
The manufacturer builds to order and faces two sources of demand: one from
the direct channel and the other from the retailer. The sequence of events for the
manufacturer is the following: At the beginning of the period, the manufacturer
receives an order from the retailer and meets that order. Throughout the period, the
manufacturer continues to build to order to meet the demand from its direct channel.
At the end of the period, the retailer may observe excess demand over the initial
stocking quantity. When that happens, the retailer will backorder excess demand
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and will procure the needed quantity from the manufacturer. The manufacturer will
meet the retailer’s additional demand charging the same wholesale price as before.
Given that the retailer backorders the excess demand from the manufacturer, the
quantity that the manufacturer sells to the retailer is the maximum of the retailer’s




The quantity that the manufacturer sells through the direct channel, on the other
hand, is simply the demand from the direct channel, DMk (S
R,pM,pR). Let ck denote




















Notice from (4.9) that the first term corresponds to the expected profit from the
direct channel and the second term corresponds to the profit collected by selling
to the retailer. We substitute for yk in (4.9) using the definition in (4.5). Note





























(wk − ck)θkqRk(SR,pR), (4.10)
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where
θk := σk (zk + IN(zk)) + 1. (4.11)
We refer to θk as the ”safety stock factor” for variant k. Notice the significance of the
safety stock factor: For each variant, the expected quantity sold by the manufacturer
to the retailer is the variant’s expected demand times its safety stock factor, which
itself depends on the service level and demand’s coefficient of variation, as shown in
(4.11). This factor is always larger than one. It captures the fact that the total quan-
tity that the retailer buys from the manufacturer is an amplification of the expected
demand. To understand the intuition behind this amplification, recall that the re-
tailer backorders from the manufacturer whenever there is a shortage. Therefore, the
total quantity the retailer buys from the manufacturer is never below the demand,
but it may exceed the demand when the retailer overstocks. The factor θk captures
this effect.
4.4. The Pricing Problem in the Dual Channel
In this section we explore the retailer’s and manufacturer’s pricing problem as-
suming a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader. To examine the
retailer’s pricing decision, we assume that the retailer’s assortment, SR, is exogenously
fixed. The sequence of decisions for this game is the following: (1) the manufacturer
picks the wholesale prices, wk, and direct channel prices, p
M
k , (2) the retailer sets its
prices, pRk. We first analyze the retailer’s pricing decision in response to the manufac-
turer’s wholesale prices, w, and direct channel prices, pM. As stated in the following
proposition, we find that the retailer will price its products following an equal effective
margin property.
Proposition 16. Consider variant k in the retailer’s assortment SR. Let mRk := p
R
k−
wk − γk denote the effective profit margin of variant k. Given the vector of wholesale
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prices, w, the vector of direct channel prices, pM, and the retailer’s assortment, SR,
any price vector that is optimal for the retailer is such that all variants have the same
effective profit margin, i.e., mRk = m
R for all k ∈ SR.
Proposition 16 reduces the retailer’s pricing decision to picking a single effective
margin, mR, for all the variants in its assortment SR. This result shows the same
pricing structure as Proposition 1 in Chapter II.
Recall the expression for the retailer’s profit, ΠR(SR,pM,w,pR), given by (4.8).
Using the result of Proposition 16, we obtain:
∑
k∈SR





Using the equality above, we can rewrite the retailer’s profit, ΠR(SR,pM,pR), as
ΠR(SR,pM,pR) = τR(SR,pM,pR)mR. (4.12)
Furthermore, he probability that the customer chooses the retailer, τR(SR,pM,pR),
can be rewritten as a function of mR instead of the price vector pR. To this end,
for variant k in retailer’s assortment SR, define the retailer’s surplus associated with
variant k as
ηRk := αk − wk − γk for k ∈ SR. (4.13)
Note that the surplus is the customer’s expected utility from the variant minus the
costs the retailer incurs for carrying that variant. Using the above definition, we can
define the function vRk(m
R) as follows:
vRk(m
R) := exp([ηRk −mR]/µ2) for k ∈ SR. (4.14)
Using (4.13) and (4.14), we can now write τR(SR,pM,pR) in (4.4) as a function of the
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]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SR vRk(mR)]µ2/µ1 . (4.15)
Using the expression above, we are now ready to rewrite the retailer’s expected profit,
ΠR(SR,pM,pR) in (4.12), as a function of the effective margin, mR instead of the price
vector, pR
ΠR(SR,pM,mR) = τR(SR,pM,mR)mR. (4.16)
The following proposition uses the redefined profit function in (4.16) to charac-
terize the retailer’s optimal margin as a function of the wholesale prices, w, direct
channel prices, pM, and the retailer’s assortment, SR.
Proposition 17. Given the vector of wholesale prices, w, the vector of direct channel
prices, pM, and the retailer’s assortment, SR, the retailer’s optimal effective margin





Proposition 17 characterizes the retailer’s optimal pricing response to any vector
of wholesale prices, w, and direct channel prices, pM, chosen by the manufacturer.
Given the retailer’s optimal pricing response, we next analyze the manufacturer’s
optimal pricing decisions.
In the manufacturer’s profit function, the retailer’s price vector can now be re-
placed with the retailer’s effective margin. The details of this simplification are pro-
vided in Appendix C. This simplification facilitates further analysis of the manufac-
turer’s pricing problem. The next proposition describes the properties of the optimal
direct channel and wholesale prices.
68
Proposition 18. Define mMk := p
M
k − ck as the manufacturer’s effective profit margin
for k ∈ SM sold through the direct channel and wk := (wk−ck−µ2)θk as the weighted
wholesale price for variant k ∈ SR. At any optimal vector of wholesale prices, w, and
optimal vector of direct channel prices, pM:
(a) All variants k ∈ SM will have the same effective margin, i.e. mMk = mM for
all k ∈ SM .
(b) All variants k ∈ SR will have the same weighted wholesale price, i.e. wk = w
for all k ∈ SR.
The result in Proposition 18 (a) does not comes as a surprise given that we found
the same structure in different settings, where the effective margin (i.e. gross margin
net of unit inventory cost) must be the same for all variants in the channel. In this
case, what is the same across variants is the gross margin because the manufacturer’s
direct channel has no inventory-related costs.
Proposition 18 (b) has important consequences regarding the effect of demand
variability on the wholesale prices, as we state in the following proposition.
Proposition 19. Suppose that all variants are the same in all respects but θk, i.e.
αk = α, ck = c and γk = γ for all k ∈ SR. Let i and j be two of the variants carried
in the retailer’s assortment. If θi < θj then wi > wj. Furthermore, if i and j are
identical in all respects but the demand’s coefficient of variation, with σi < σj, then
wi > wj.
Proposition 19 states that the larger the demand variability of a variant (measured
by demand’s coefficient of variation), the lower the variant’s wholesale price. In
general, the proposition indicates that variants with higher safety stock factors will
prompt lower prices from the manufacturer. The intuition behind this result lies in
the safety stock factor, θk. Suppose we start with a number of products identical
in all respects, and we then increase the coefficient of variation for one of them, say
variant h. Now, the safety stock factor for variant h also increases. In other words,
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for variant h, the retailer’s order quantity is going to be a larger amplification of the
expected demand compared to other variants. Hence, this variant now becomes more
attractive for the manufacturer, so the manufacturer decreases the wholesale price to
increase the market share of this variant among others.
Using Proposition 18 we can recast the manufacturer’s profit as a function of
a single effective wholesale price (instead of a wholesale price vector) and a single
effective margin for the direct channel (instead of a price vector for the direct channel).
These simplifications, which are presented in detail in the appendix, allow us to
further analyze assortment selection and pricing in a dual-channel setting.
4.5. Effects of Adding a Retailer to a Direct Channel on the Manufac-
turer’s Profit
In this section, we explore how adding an indirect channel (i.e. retailer) influences
a manufacturer currently selling directly to the customer. In order to understand
the benefits of dual-sales channels, we first explore the effect of adding an indirect
channel on the pricing decisions.
Recall that the manufacturer decides the wholesale prices and direct-channel
prices. We find that the manufacturer will always increase the gross margin used
by its direct channel when it adds an indirect channel.
Proposition 20. Let mM
direct
be the manufacturer’s optimal direct channel margin
when selling through the direct channel only and mM
dual
be the manufacturer’s optimal





It is interesting that the manufacturer increases its direct channel margin despite
introducing a competing source of product, the retailer, into the channel mix. To
understand the intuition behind this result, note that the manufacturer’s choice of
direct margin is ultimately a trade-off between its sales volume and unit margin.
Once the retailer is introduced to the mix, it is true that the volume sold through
the direct channel will decrease as some customers will switch to the retailer. How-
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ever, the manufacturer’s total sales volume, combined across both channels, will now
be higher than it was when the manufacturer had only the direct channel, because
fewer customers will now choose to go with the external alternative. Given that the
manufacturer’s total sales volume will increase after the addition of the retailer, the
manufacturer will respond by increasing its direct channel margin to take advantage
of the larger sales volume.
Given that adding a retailer results in an increase in both the total sales volume
and the direct channel’s effective margin, the manufacturer will always benefit from
using a dual-channel strategy.
Proposition 21. Let ΠM
direct
be the manufacturer’s optimal expected profit when selling
through the direct channel only and ΠM
dual
be the manufacturer’s optimal expected profit






While the manufacturer always benefits from adding a retailer to the channel mix,
the size of the benefit does depend on the assortment offered through the retailer.
In Table 4.1, we present an example with three alternatives: The first example is
one where the manufacturer is only selling directly to the customer, i.e. SR = {∅},
in the second example the manufacturer is selling variant 1 through the retailer, i.e.
SR = {1}, and in the third example the manufacturer is selling variant 2 through
the retailer, i.e. SR = {2}. Notice that the manufacturer’s expected profit, ΠM ,
increases as the indirect-channel is added as predicted by Proposition 21. However,
notice that carrying variant 1 through the retailer is more profitable than carrying
variant 2. Also notice that variants 1 and 2 are identical in all respects except for
the difference between γ1 and γ2, the parameters that capture the inventory-related
unit costs associated with variants 1 and 2, respectively. This example highlights
two aspects of the problem we are studying: First, the assortment decision on what
to offer through the retailer plays an important role on the manufacturer’s profit.
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SR mM w mR ΠM ΠR
{∅} 3.0992 — — 1.5992 0
{1} 3.2839 3.1954 1.6586 1.8041 0.1586
{2} 3.2489 3.1163 1.6278 1.7620 0.1278
Table 4.1: Manufacturer’s profit improvements of adding an indirect-channel to a
direct-channel. In this example, µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 0.5, α0 = 10, α1 = α2 = 5,
c1 = c2 = 1, γ1 = 0.4034, γ2 = 0.08068 and θ1 = θ2 = 1.2008.
Second, even when the manufacturer builds to order (as is the case in our model),
the inventory costs that the retailer incurs for its assortment will influence not only
the retailer’s profit, but also the manufacturer’s profit. Hence, we next explore the
assortment decision on what to offer through the retailer.
4.6. Assortment Results
In this section, we explore the retailer’s assortment decision. Depending on the
power structure in the supply chain, the retailer may choose its own assortment or the
manufacturer may decide on the assortment it is going to offer through the retailer.
Hence, in this section we explore both cases. In terms of the timing of the assortment
decision, we consider three alternative scenarios. In Scenario 1, the manufacturer
picks the assortment while it is choosing its direct channel and wholesale prices. In
Scenario 2, the retailer picks the assortment after the manufacturer makes its pricing
decisions. In Scenario 3, the retailer picks the assortment before the manufacturer
makes its pricing decisions.
Next we explore Scenario 1. Suppose that the manufacturer can pick the as-
sortment offered through the retailer, SR. Then the manufacturer will offer every
available variant as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 22. In Scenario 1, where the manufacturer is choosing the retailer’s
assortment in addition to setting the direct channel and wholesale prices, the manu-
facturer will always choose to offer all variants through the retailer.
This result may seem surprising given the fact that the retailer’s assortment is
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going to compete with the direct channel’s assortment. However, the manufacturer
can always utilize its ability to manipulate the retailer’s demand through its wholesale
price choice. Hence, the manufacturer can always price the products to get a favorable
combination of market share and margin.
Now consider Scenario 2, where the retailer picks its assortment after the man-
ufacturer makes its pricing decisions. In this scenario, we find that the retailer will
always choose to carry all available variants.
Proposition 23. In Scenario 2, where the retailer picks its assortment after the man-
ufacturer makes its pricing decision, the retailer will choose to offer every available
variant.
Proposition 23 is analogous to Proposition 3 in Section 2.4.2. As discussed earlier
in Chapter II, the driver of this result is the fact that the retailer uses its pricing
decision to balance the gross profit and inventory-related costs of its variants so that
all variants are equally attractive to be carried in the assortment.
The common ground that joins scenarios 1 and 2 is that they both assume that
the assortment decision is made between the manufacturer’s pricing decisions and the
retailer’s pricing decision. In contrast, Scenario 3 assumes that the retailer picks its
assortment before the pricing decisions for either firm are made.
Under Scenario 3, we find that even if the retailer has no constraints on the number
of variants to carry nor has a fixed cost for carrying a variant, the retailer may still
choose not to carry all possible variants in its assortment. We illustrate this result
with an example in Table 4.2. In this example, the manufacturer has an assortment
of two variants and the retailer can choose to carry only one variant, two variants or
neither. Observe that when the retailer carries variant 2 in its assortment (either on
its own or along with variant 1) the retailer charges larger prices to the customer.
The reason for increase in prices is that variant 2 shows higher demand variability and
therefore, the inventory related costs associated with carrying this variant are large
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Profit Prices
SR Manufacturer Retailer pM1 p
M





{1} 1.9738 0.1731 4.6535 4.6535 4.5827 – 7.0810 –
{2} 1.9347 0.1175 4.6231 4.6231 – 4.1709 – 7.7250
{1, 2} 1.9812 0.1722 4.6603 4.6603 4.6535 4.0084 7.1509 7.6172
Table 4.2: Manufacturer and Retailer’s Profit and Margins for a Two-Variant Assort-
ment. In this example, the variant 1 and 2 are the same in all respects
but the demand’s coefficient of variation σk, where, σ1 = 0.09, σ2 = 0.25,
µ1 = 1.7, µ2 = 0.3, α0 = 10, α1 = α2 = 5, c1 = c2 = 1, co1 = co2 = 4,
cu1 = cu2 = 4 and z1 = z2 = 1.7.
for the retailer. It is interesting that this will happen even when the manufacturer
will choose a lower wholesale price of variant 2 compared to variant 1, as discussed
in Proposition 19. In this example, the retailer would choose to leave variant 2 out
of its assortment in order to push the inventory related costs down.
4.6.1 Assortment Selection Problem
An important assumption made in the previous section for Propositions 22 and
23 is that there are no constraints on the number of variants that the retailer can
offer and there are no fixed costs for carrying a variant. In this section we relax this
assumption for two simplified versions of the problem. First, we explore a problem
where the retailer is constrained to offer only one variant. This setting allows us to
explore what product characteristics present conflicts between the retailer and the
manufacturer when it comes to the assortment offered by the retailer. Second, we
explore the case where all variants are identical and there is a fixed cost associated
with the number of variants carried at the retailer. This setting allows us to explore




Consider the case where the retailer can offer a single variant. The next proposition
compares Scenarios 1 and 2.
Proposition 24. Suppose that the retailer can offers only one variant from SM .
Then the variant that would be offered through the retailer under Scenario 1 is the
same as the variant that would be offered under Scenario 2.
Recalling the definitions of Scenarios 1 and 2, Proposition 24 states that as long
as the retailer’s assortment is chosen after the manufacturer sets its prices but before
the retailer does, the manufacturer and retailer are in agreement about what variant
the retailer should offer.
We next analyze the case where the retailer chooses its assortment before the
manufacturer sets its prices: Do the manufacturer and the retailer still agree on
what variant to offer through the retailer? In other words, we compare Scenario 1
(where the manufacturer chooses what to offer through the retailer) and Scenario 3
(where the retailer chooses what to offer, but before the manufacturer sets its prices).
Proposition 25 identifies certain conditions under which the same variant is chosen
under both Scenarios 1 and 3.
Proposition 25. Consider a manufacturer’s assortment that consists of only variants
1 and 2, i.e. SM = {1, 2}. Let variants 1 and 2 be the same in all respects but the
overage and/or underage costs, i.e. α1 = α2, c1 = c2, θ1 = θ2. Under both Scenario
1 and Scenario 3, the variant that will be offered through the retailer is the one with
the lower underage/overage cost.
Proposition 25 presents a setting in which the retailer and the manufacturer will
not face a conflict in terms of what should be carried through the retailer. However,
the same is not true for variants that differ only in the demand’s coefficient of vari-
ation. In such a case, we find that there exist situations where the manufacturer,
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SR ΠM ΠR pM1 p
M





{ 1} 5.3526 0.2864 7.9969 7.9969 7.6224 – 10.2340 –
{ 2} 5.3889 0.2597 8.0322 8.0322 – 6.7291 – 10.4254
Table 4.3: Profits of a Retailer’s Single-Variant Assortment. In this example, the
variant 1 and 2 are the same in all respects but the demand’s coefficient
of variation σk, where µ1 = 1.7, µ2 = 0.3, σ1 = 0.09, σ2 = 0.25, α0 = 10,
α1 = α2 = 10, c1 = c2 = 1, co1 = co2 = 4, cu1 = cu2 = 4 and z1 = z2 = 1.7;
θ1 = 1.1546, θ2 = 1.4296, γ1 = 0.6252, and γ2 = 1.7366.
in Scenario 1, will prefer to offer through the retailer the variant with the higher
demand’s coefficient of variation whereas the retailer, in Scenario 3, will choose the
variant that has the lower coefficient of variation. In Table 4.3, we provide an exam-
ple showing such a conflict. In this example there are two variants, labeled 1 and 2.
They are the same in all respects but the demand’s coefficient of variation, σk. The
retailer decides according to Scenario 3. Here the coefficient of variation for variant 2
is significantly larger than the one for variant 1. Observe that the retailer’s expected
profit is higher when it carries only variant 1, whereas the manufacturer’s expected
profit is higher when the retailer carries variant 2.
The most significant driver of this conflict is the fact that variant 2 has a higher
safety factor, i.e. θ2 > θ1. Hence the manufacturer will show preference for variant 2.
However, variant 2 also has higher inventory costs, i.e. γ2 > γ1 which makes it less
attractive for the retailer. Hence, the retailer prefers variant 1, but the manufacturer
prefers variant 2.
4.6.1.2 Assortment Size
In this section we explore the assortment size preference of the manufacturer and
retailer for a simplified version of the base model. Suppose that both the retailer
and the manufacturer incur a fixed cost for every product carried in the retailer’s
assortment. Furthermore, suppose that all variants are identical, i.e., αk, ck, γk and
θk are all the same for all k ∈ SM . We assume that the assortment decision is made
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after the manufacturer picks its prices, i.e. Scenarios 1 and 2. In this setting, we
compare the retailer’s and manufacturer’s preference for the size of the assortment
offered through the retailer. We find that the manufacturer prefers a larger assortment
than the retailer.
Proposition 26. Suppose θk < 2. The optimal size of the retailer’s assortment is
larger under Scenario 1 than under Scenario 2.
Proposition 26 implies that, when the assortment decision is made after the manu-
facturer’s pricing decision but before the retailer’s pricing decision, the manufacturer
will always prefer a broader assortment than the one preferred by the retailer. There
are two reasons for this discrepancy. First, the retailer incurs inventory costs for each
variant in its assortment while the manufacturer doesn’t. Second, when the demand
falls short of stock level, the retailer sells only up to demand, but the manufacturer’s
sales quantity is what the retailer stocked. Thus, the manufacturer always sells at
least as much as the retailer, and sometimes strictly more, thereby benefiting more
from each variant than the retailer does.
4.7. Conclusion
This chapter studies a supply chain structure where the upper echelon supplies
and competes with the lower echelon. We study this setting by modeling a build-to-
order manufacturer selling directly to the customer and also through a retailer. The
customer is assumed to be able to purchase from either firm and the manufacturer
will offer all available variants, whereas the retailer will offer only a subset of variants.
There are three main challenges that this type of problem poses: First we have the
manufacturer’s decision to set direct channel prices and wholesale prices, while taking
into account the competition from the retailer. Second, the retailer’s manages not
only prices but also inventory levels. Third, both the retailer and the manufacturer
must be concerned about the effects of the retailer’s assortment on their profits.
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In this setting, we first look at the firms’ pricing problems. We find that for the
retailer, the pricing structure will be the same as the one found in earlier chapters,
where the prices should follow an equal effective margin. The optimal wholesale
prices on the other hand show a different structure: The wholesale price net of unit
production and inventory costs, weighted by the item’s safety stock factor, must be
the same across all items. Here, the safety stock factor is a function of the item’s
service level and demand variability. This structure has some immediate implications.
For example, if all items are the same but some show higher demand variability, then
those items with higher demand variability will have a lower wholesale price attached
to them. The rationale behind this result is that, for these items, the retailer’s order
quantity will represent a larger amplification of the expected demand, compared to
other items with lower demand variability. Hence, the manufacturer will want these
items to have a larger market share, which can be induced by keeping the wholesale
price low.
Given the increasing diversification of channels, we also explore if a manufacturer,
who is currently selling through a direct channel, benefits from adding a retailer to its
channel mix. This decision is non-trivial because the two channels will be competing
against each other. We find that even though the direct channel will observe a decrease
in its market share, the manufacturer will increase its total market share (where total
market share includes the demand from both channels). Hence, the manufacturer
will always benefit from adding a channel, giving it another venue to capture more
customers.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is that is explores the retailer’s
assortment decision. First, we assume that there are no limitations on the number of
variants to offer through the retailer and that there are no fixed costs of carrying a
variant. In this setting, we explore scenarios that differ in mainly two aspects: who
decides the retailer’s assortment (the retailer or the manufacturer itself) and when
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the assortment decision is made relative to pricing decisions. We find that depending
on the sequence of decisions, the manufacturer’s preference may conflict with the
retailer’s. In particular, in certain cases, the manufacturer wishes the retailer to offer
items with high demand variability while the retailer opts for low demand variability.
In addition, when both the retailer and the manufacturer incur a fixed cost for
the variants carried by the retailer, we find that the manufacturer prefers a broader





In its broadest sense, this dissertation studies joint pricing and assortment problems
with inventory considerations. Two main settings are studied. One of these settings
considers a single firm selling a configurable product. The configurable product is
formed by putting together two components: one required for product functionality
(i.e. required component) and one that enhances or complements the product but is
not essential for the product to work (i.e. optional component). Several scenarios are
considered and are presented in Chapters II and III. The second setting is one where
there is one firm (manufacturer) who sells directly to the customers and through an
independent retailer. The retailer is then a collaborator and a competitor to the man-
ufacturer. This setting is treated in Chapter IV. Next, we discuss the contributions
of this dissertation, grouped into several themes.
Effects of inventory-related parameters on pricing : Throughout this dissertation
there is evidence that inventory considerations play an important role in the pricing
decisions.
Chapters II and III find that the optimal prices for the variants of a component
should be such that they all have the same effective profit margin (i.e., the selling
price net of unit purchase cost and unit inventory cost). This result extends previous
work, which ignored inventory costs and found that gross margins (selling price net
of unit purchase cost) should be equal across variants. This result may explain why
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variants with higher overage and underage costs also have higher gross margins.
Chapter IV adds to the pricing results in Chapters II and III by finding the optimal
structure for wholesale pricing. In particular, the chapter finds that the wholesale
price net of unit production and inventory costs, weighted by the item’s safety stock
factor, must be the same across all items. The safety stock factor is a function of the
item’s service level and demand variability.
Assortment decisions - Importance of inventory related parameters and channel
structures : Chapter II highlights the importance of a variant’s surplus. The surplus
is a measure of the variant’s profitability that depends on the customer’s utility from
the variant, the variant’s unit purchase cost, unit underage and overage costs, service
level and demand variability. This surplus measure combines all demand-side and
supply-side parameters in a clear-cut measure that translates into variant profitability
within a component. By incorporating demand-side and supply-side parameters, it
inherently accounts for the effect of inventory costs on assortment selection.
When choosing between two variants, each of which belongs to a different com-
ponent, we find that the surplus itself is not enough to determine which variant to
carry in the assortment. Chapter II also sets the ground for making such decisions and
shows the importance of taking into account the complementary relationship between
the components. To that end, the chapter establishes a measure of the attractiveness
of a product configuration. This attractiveness measure draws upon the surpluses
of the component variants that go into a configuration. When choosing from two
variants that belong to different components, one must weigh the attractiveness of
the new configurations enabled by the addition of each variant, and pick the variant
that leads to the more attractive set of new configurations.
In Chapter IV, we explore the assortment that should be offered through the
retailer, when the manufacturer has a competing direct channel. We develop several
scenarios that differ from each other in terms of who is making the assortment decision
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(manufacturer or retailer) and the sequence of the decision making process (when the
assortment decision is made relative to the pricing decision). We find that some of
the scenarios will trigger conflicts on the assortment decision, where the manufacturer
will prefer the retailer to offer all available variants and the retailer will prefer a
narrower assortment. When there are restrictions on the number of variants that can
be offered through the retailer, a particular conflict may arise, in which the retailer
prefers to offer the item with lower demand variability (as measured by the demand’s
coefficient of variation), while the manufacturer prefers the item with higher demand
variability. In addition, when both the retailer and the manufacturer incur a fixed
cost for the variants carried by the retailer, we find that the manufacturer prefers
a broader assortment than the retailer even when the manufacturer’s fixed cost is
slightly higher than the retailer.
Benefits of selling through dual channels : In Chapter IV, we studied the manu-
facturer’s benefits from adding a retailer to an existing direct sales channel. In this
setting we find that increasing diversification of the channels is always beneficial to
the manufacturer. This result may be surprising because the retailer will compete
with the manufacturer’s direct channel. However, we find that even though the manu-
facturer’s direct channel will observe a decrease in its market share, the manufacturer
will increase its total market share (where the total market share includes the demand
from both channels).
Effect of the marketing strategy on the assortment and pricing : In Chapter II
the customer decides what product to purchase based on the entire assortment and
prices. In such a case, we find that the optimal effective margin is zero for the optional
component. In Chapter III, the model is extended to consider the possibility that
only one of the components (the required component) is the driver of store traffic, i.e.
the customer’s decision to purchase from the retailer depends only on the assortment
and prices of the required component. In this setting, the optional component is now
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sold at a positive effective margin. Therefore, when selling configurable products, the
firm’s optimal pricing strategy depends very much on how the firm is marketing the
optional component.
Price discrimination strategy in the presence of different customer segments : Chap-
ter III explores a problem where there are two segments in the customer population.
One segment is assumed to be shopping for the required and, possibly, the optional
component, while the other segment is shopping only for the optional component
(maybe because they bought the required component at an earlier time). In this set-
ting, we find that the firm will benefit from a price discrimination strategy in which
all customers who purchase the required component receive a discount on the optional
component while those buying only the optional component pay the full price for it.
5.1. Future work
First, the model presented in Chapter II considers a configurable product, whose
components are stocked separately and are combined only after the retailer receives
the order from the customer (e.g. Dell computers). In other settings, we may ob-
serve that the retailer will carry a set of pre-configured products, that is, the retailer
may produce some product configurations on a make-to-stock basis and others on a
make-to-order basis (e.g. vehicles sold by a dealer). The models presented in this
dissertation set the ground to study the supply chain implications of such strategies.
Another question related to configurable products is the degree to which two
variants of different components are compatible. There may be situations where the
customer’s utility from a variant depends on what variant of the other component it
will be matched with. Take for example a laptop computer that can be sold with or
without an integrated video camera. Consider now an external video camera. One
would expect that a customer’s utility from the external camera would depend very
much on whether the customer is buying a computer with or without an integrated
camera. This generalization of the model presented in Chapter II, might result in
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different assortment and pricing strategies for different types of variants. In particular,
one may expect that the optimal assortment will favor variants that are a universal
fit for any variant of the other component, that is, variants that are highly valuable
no matter what variant of the other component they are matched with. In contrast,
one may also expect that items adding special or critical value to the most profitable
variants may be the ones carried in the assortment.
In the dual-channel setting (Chapter IV), we consider a retailer who sells only
a subset of the variants sold through the manufacturer’s direct channel. A scenario
which is aligned with the motivating examples. However, we can find situations in
practice where the assortments of the manufacturer do not overlap with the assort-
ment sold through the retailer. For example, this is the case for the Hewlett Packard
(HP) desktop computers sold through Wal-Mart. HP product lines can be offered
through both channels, direct or through Wal-Mart, but the models offered through
these two channels are not the same. It will be interesting to study the settings that
push for this kind of model differentiation and how this behavior affects the profits
of the chain.
While the manufacturer’s direct channel may be selling only its own brands, the
same exclusive structure will not be likely to hold for the retailer. The retailer is more
than likely to sell multiple, competing brands. We expect that this type of competition
within the retailer’s own assortment will affect the pricing and assortment decisions
for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Moreover, such competition may alter
the manufacturer’s decision to sell through dual channels in the first place. Hence,





Proofs of Propositions in Chapter II
This appendix, as well as subsequent appendices, utilizes the Lambert-W function,
denoted by W (·). Given a number a, the Lambert-W function is defined as the value
of x that solves x exp(x) = a. In other words, the Lambert-W function is implicitly
defined as
W (a) exp(W (a)) = a.
The function W (a) is increasing in a for all a ≥ 0, which is a property used in the
proofs. For more on the properties of the Lambert-W function, see, for example,
Corless et al. (1996).
To help with the exposition of this Appendix, define vnk(pnk) as follows:
vnk(pnk) := exp(αnk − pnk), k ∈ Sn, n = R,O. (A.1)
Notice that vnk is a measure of the gap between the expected utility and the price
of variant k of component n ∈ {R,O}. In addition, recall that v[ij] was defined in
86
Section 2.3 as follows:
v[ij](pRi, pOj) = exp(αRi + αOj − pRi − pOj)
Notice that v[ij] is a measure of the gap between the expected utility and the price
of the configuration that brings together variant i of the required component and
variant j of the optional component.
Proofs of Section 2.4
In preparation for the proofs that follow, the derivatives of purchase probabilities
defined in Section 2.3 are noted below. Given the assortments of the required and
optional components, SR and SO, the following derivatives can be verified through
some algebra using the definitions of purchase probabilities in (2.1), (2.3) and (2.4):
∂qnz(pR,pO)
∂pnz
= −qnz(pR,pO)[1− qnz(pR,pO)], z ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O}, (A.2)
∂qnk(pR,pO)
∂pnz
= qnk(pR,pO)qnz(pR,pO), k, z ∈ Sn, k 6= z, n ∈ {R,O}, (A.3)
∂qRk(pR,pO)
∂pOz
= −q[kz](pR,pO) + qRk(pR,pO)qOz(pR,pO), k ∈ SR, z ∈ SO and (A.4)
∂qOk(pR,pO)
∂pRz
= −q[zk](pR,pO) + qRz(pR,pO)qOk(pR,pO), z ∈ SR, k ∈ SO. (A.5)
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that the assortments, SR and SO, are fixed as
required by the proposition. In this proof, SR and SO are dropped from the argument
list of the functions, since they are exogenously fixed for the purposes of this proof.
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). To this end, we start




), given by (2.8),
87
with respect to the price of variant z of component n ∈ {R,O}, pnz. The following
derivatives can be verified through algebra and using the derivatives of the purchase



















(pOk − cOk − γOk)
vOk(pOk)∑
j∈SO vOj(pOj) + exp(αO)
 ,
(A.6)





























































Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices at a boundary, and the optimal
price vectors must satisfy the FOC.
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that satisfy the FOC in (A.6) and (A.7) must also satisfy the
property that pRz− cRz− γRz is the same for all z ∈ SR and pOz− cOz− γOz is the same
for all z ∈ SO.
For the case of z ∈ SR, note that setting (A.6) equal to zero (to obtain the FOC
with respect to z ∈ SR) and re-arranging the terms yields the following:









(pOk − cOk − γOk)
vOk(pOk)∑
j∈SO vOj(pOj) + exp(αO)
Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation is the same for all
z ∈ SR. Therefore, pRz − cRz − γRz is the same for all z ∈ SR. Likewise, using (A.7),
one can verify that pOz − cOz − γOz is the same for all z ∈ SO. Therefore, the op-
timization over prices reduces to optimizing over two margins, mR and mO, where
pnz − cnz − γnz = mn for all z ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O}.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that the assortments SR and SO are fixed for the
purposes of this proposition, hence they are dropped from the argument list of the
functions. One could check that partial derivative of q0(mR,mO), given by (2.10), and
the partial derivative of qO(mR,mO), given by (2.11), with respect to mR and mO are:
∂q0(mR,mO)
∂mR
= q0(mR,mO)[1− q0(mR,mO)] > 0, (A.8)
∂q0(mR,mO)
∂mO






= qO(mR,mO) [1− q0(mR,mO)− qO(mR,mO)] . (A.11)
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Using the derivatives above and through some algebra one could verify that the partial
derivative of Π(mR,mO), given by (2.12), with respect to mR and mO, yields,
∂Π(mR,mO)
∂mR
= 1− q0(mR,mO)−mRq0(mR,mO)[1− q0(mR,mO)]













Recall from Proposition 1 that the optimal prices must be interior solutions, that is,
−∞ < pnz < ∞ for z ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O}. In addition, by Proposition 1, the margin,
mn, and the price, pnz, differ by a finite constant cnz + γnz. Therefore, the optimal
margins mR and mO must also be interior solutions, i.e., −∞ < mR,mO < ∞. Thus,
mR and mO must satisfy the FOC of Π(mR,mO). Now, observe from (A.13) that at





= 0, we must have mOqO(mR,mO) = 0. The only
value of mO < ∞ that satisfies this last equality is mO = 0. Thus, at the optimal








It remains to show that there is a unique mR that satisfies the above equality. Using
the definition of q0(mR,mO) provided in (2.10) and substituting mO = 0, one can
rewrite the above equality as:




j∈SO∪{0} exp(ηRi + ηOj)
exp(α0 + 1)
.
Applying the definition of the Lambert-W function to the equality above, one can
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write








Observe that the right-hand side of the above equality does not depend on mR and
the left-hand side is strictly increasing in mR. Therefore, there exists a unique mR
that satisfies the FOC.
Proofs of Propositions 3, 4 and 5: Given assortments SR and SO for the re-
quired and optional components, let m∗
R
(SR, SO) and m
∗
O
(SR, SO) denote the optimal
margins for the required and optional components, respectively. Let q∗0(SR, SO) and
Π∗(SR, SO) denote, respectively, the probability that the customer will not purchase
from the firm and the firm’s expected profit, given that the margins are set equal
to their optimal values m∗
R
(SR, SO) and m
∗
O
(SR, SO). Recall from Proposition 2 that
m∗
O


















− 1 = m∗
R
(SR, SO)− 1.
Observe from above that the larger the optimal margin for the required component,
m∗
R
(SR, SO), the larger the firm’s optimal expected profit, Π
∗(SR, SO). Therefore,
any change to assortment SR or SO will increase the profit if and only if it increases
m∗
R
(SR, SO). Furthermore, the larger the increase in m
∗
R
(SR, SO) due to a change in
assortment, the larger the increase in Π∗(SR, SO). This observation is used next to
prove Propositions 3, 4 and 5. In addition, recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that
m∗
R
(SR, SO) is the unique solution to (A.14). Therefore:
m∗
R









To prove Proposition 3, notice that if a new variant is added to SR or SO, the RHS
of (A.15) will become strictly larger, which means that m∗
R
(SR, SO) will also become
strictly larger.
To prove Proposition 4, observe from (A.15) that if ηnk > ηnl for variants k and l
of component n, then adding variant k to Sn leads to a larger optimal margin for the






(SR, SO ∪ {l}); if ηRk > ηRl, then m∗R(SR ∪ {k}, SO) > m∗R(SR ∪ {l}, SO).
The result now follows.
To prove Proposition 5, first note that, given variant k for the required component
and variant z for the optional component, it is better to add variant k instead of
variant z if and only if m∗
R
(SR ∪ {k}, SO) > m∗R(SR, SO ∪ {z}). One can use the












Notice from the above equation that m∗
R







This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6: From Proposition 4, we know that, given a set of new
variants of component n ∈ {R,O} to choose from, it is always better to add the
variant with the largest surplus, i.e., choose variant k with the largest value of ηnk.















part (c), note that first and second derivatives of γnk with respect to znk are
γ′nk = σnk (c
o


























which also defines the critical value z. Part (c) now follows.
Proofs of Section 2.5
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that the assortments, SR and SO, are fixed as
required by the proposition. Then, the firm’s problem in (2.14) reduces to picking








). In this proof,
SR and SO are dropped from the argument list of the functions. Let vnk(pnk) be
defined as in (A.1). Using the derivatives of the purchase probabilities qnk(pR,pO)
provided in (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5), and through some algebra, the following





















































































Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices at a boundary, and the optimal
price vectors must satisfy the FOC.




must satisfy the property
that pRk − cRk are the same for all k ∈ SR and pOk − cOk are the same for all k ∈ SO.




























Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above FOCs are the same for all k ∈ Sn.
Therefore, pnk − cnk = mn for all k ∈ Sn, n ∈ {R,O}, where mn is the gross profit
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margin of component n.





), given by (2.14), in terms of the gross margins, mR andmO. In the remainder
of the proof, define η
Ri
























j∈SO exp(ηOj −mO) + exp(ηO)
] .






























j∈SO exp(ηOj −mO) + exp(ηO)
] .










Because the optimal prices cannot be at the boundaries (i.e., they must be finite),
the optimal margins mR and mO cannot be at the boundaries either and, hence, they
must satisfy the FOC of (A.19). Taking the derivative of (A.19) with respect to the
margins mR and mO yield the following FOC. (The following derivatives can be verified
through some algebra after noting that ∂q0(mR,mO)
∂mR






= −mRq0(mR,mO) [1− q0(mR,mO)] + 1− q0(mR,mO)






















it must be that mO = 0. Hence, the only mO that satisfies the FOC is mO = 0.






It remains to show that there is a unique mR that satisfies the above equality. Substi-
tuting for q0(mR, 0) in the above equation and algebraically manipulating the terms,
one can rewrite the above equality as:




j∈SO∪{0} exp(ηRi + ηOj)
exp(α0 + 1)
.
Applying the definition of the Lambert-W function to the equality above, one can
write








Observe that the right-hand side of the above equality does not depend on mR and
the left-hand side is strictly increasing in mR. Therefore, there exists a unique mR
that satisfies the FOC.
Proof of Propositions 8 and 9: Given assortments SR and SO for the required and
optional components, let m∗
R
(SR, SO) and m
∗
O
(SR, SO) denote the optimal margins for
the required and optional components, respectively. Let q∗0(SR, SO) and Π
∗
(SR, SO)
denote the no-purchase probability and the expected profit at the optimal margins
m∗
R
(SR, SO) and m
∗
O
(SR, SO). Recall from Proposition 7 that m
∗
O





. Substituting these values for m∗
R
(SR, SO) and m
∗
O
(SR, SO) in the




























Observe from above that the larger the optimal margin for the required component,
m∗
R
(SR, SO), the larger the firm’s optimal expected profit, Π
∗
(SR, SO). Observe also
that any addition to assortment SR or SO will increase the inventory related costs.
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In particular, adding a new variant k to the assortment of component n will increase
the inventory cost by exactly γnk. Hence, adding a new variant will improve the
firm’s profit if and only if the improvement in the margin outweighs the increase in
inventory costs, i.e. if m∗
R
(SR ∪ k, SO) −m∗R(SR, SO) > γRk in the case of expanding
the required component’s assortment, and m∗
R
(SR, SO ∪ k)−m∗R(SR, SO) > γOk in the
case of expanding the optional component’s assortment. This concludes the proof of
Proposition 8.
As for Proposition 9, first recall from the proof of Proposition 7 that the optimal
mR must satisfy (A.22). Observe from (A.22) that if ηnk > ηnl for variants k and l of
component n, then adding variant k to Sn leads to a larger optimal margin for the






(SR, SO ∪ {l}); if ηRk > ηRl, then m∗R(SR ∪ {k}, SO) > m∗R(SR ∪ {l}, SO).
Recalling the definition that ηnk = αnk − cnk, the result now follows.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Propositions in Chapter III
Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Proposition 10: Suppose that the assortments, SR and SO, are fixed as
required by the proposition; hence we will drop SR and SO from the argument list









), given by (3.4).





satisfy the property that pnk − cnk − γnk is the same for all k ∈ Sn. Let vnk(pnk) be
defined as in (A.1). The following partial derivatives of q̂Rk(pR), given by (3.1), and
q̂Ok(pR,pO), given by (3.3), can be verified through some algebra:
∂q̂Rk(pR)
∂pRz
= q̂Rk(pR)q̂Rz(pR) for k, z ∈ SR, k 6= z,
∂q̂Rz(pR)
∂pRz



































, for z ∈
SO.
















































− (pOz − cOz − γOz) + 1
 . (B.2)






































Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices at the boundary, and the optimal
price vectors must satisfy the FOC. Setting the derivatives in (B.1) and (B.2) equal
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) with respect to pRz and pOz, respectively:
pRz − cRz − γRz =
∑
k∈SR











pOz − cOz − γOz =
∑
k∈SO






Observe that the RHS of (B.3) is the same for all z ∈ SR and the RHS of (B.4) is
the same for all z ∈ SO. Therefore, fixing n ∈ {R,O}, we have pnk − cnk − γnk = mn
for all k ∈ Sn, where mn is the effective profit margin of component n.





), given by (3.4), in terms of the effective margins, mR and mO. Using ηnk,
defined in (2.9), we first rewrite q̂Rk(pR) and q̂Ok(pR,pO), given respectively by (3.1)

















, k ∈ SO. (B.6)



























The following derivatives of Π̂(mR,mO) with respect to mR and mO can be verified
through some algebra and using the observation that ∂q̂0(mR)
∂mR
































































Using the second derivatives and the cross derivative listed above, we obtain the
following for the Hessian of Π̂(mR,mO) at any pair of mR and mO that satisfy the
FOC, i.e., at any pair of mR and mO such that (B.9) and (B.10) are both zero. (To








 − [1− q̂0(mR)] 0









Observe that the above Hessian is negative definite. Therefore, at any (mR,mO) pair
that satisfies the FOC of Π̂(mR,mO), the function Π̂(mR,mO) has a local maxima.
This observation can be used to prove that there is a unique pair of (mR,mO) that
satisfy the FOC of Π̂(mR,mO), and this unique pair maximizes Π̂(mR,mO). (Here is
a sketch of this claim’s proof: If there were two such pairs, then there would have
to be two local maxima, which would then require the presence of a local minimum
in between. However, such a local minimum would contradict the earlier observation
that any stationary point is a local maxima.) In other words, the FOC are necessary





is the unique optimal margin for the optional component. As for mR, setting (B.9)





















This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11: We use the equal margin property, proved in Proposition
10, to rewrite the firm’s profit function, Π̂(SR, SO,pR,pO), given by (3.4), in terms of
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exp(ηRk−mR) . Given assortment SR∪SO, we will first













We will then use this expression for the profit to conclude the proof of the proposition.






















Substituting these two equalities in (B.8), we can write the firm’s optimal expected
profit as























































Now, algebraic manipulation of the expression for m∗
O




































Observe now that the LHS of the above equality is the firm’s profit, and the RHS
depends only on problem parameters. In particular, since the Lambert-W function is
increasing in its argument, the RHS of the above equality is increasing in each of ηRk
and ηOk. Hence, given a set of new variants that all belong to component n ∈ {R,O},
the firm will choose to add candidate k with the highest ηnk.
Proofs of Section 3.3






(pOj − cOj − wOj)q̃Oj(SO,pO) (B.14)
where q̃Oj(SO,pO) is the probability that a segment-2 customer (who shops for the
optional component only) chooses variant j of the optional component in the second
stage and is defined in (3.5). Observe that Π̃O(SO,pO) is the firm’s profit from a
customer that belongs to segment 2, given that the customer decided to purchase
from the firm.
Proof of Proposition 12: Suppose that the assortments, SR and SO, are fixed as
required by the proposition; hence we drop SR and SO from the argument list of





maximize the profit function Π̃(SR, SO,pR,pO), given by (3.6). We start by proving




must satisfy the first-order-conditions (FOC)





Let vnk(pnk) be defined as in (A.1). Taking the derivative of Π̃(pR,pO), given by


















(pOk − cOk − γOk)
vOk(pOk)∑

































The above derivatives can be verified by using the derivatives provided in the preamble
of Appendix A, i.e. (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) and the following partial derivatives
of q̃Ok(SO,pO), given by (3.5), with respect to pnk:
∂q̃Oz(pO)
∂pOz
= −q̃Oz(pO) [1− q̃Oz(pO)] for z ∈ SO, and
∂q̃Ok(pO)
∂pOz
= q̃Ok(pO)q̃Oz(pO) for k ∈
SO; k 6= z.







> 0). Also, it can be







> 0). Hence, it is never optimal to set
one of the prices at a boundary, and the optimal price vectors must satisfy the FOC.





must satisfy the property that pnk − cnk − γnk are the same for all
k ∈ Sn. Setting the first derivatives of Π̃(pR,pO) with respect to pRk and pOk, given
by (B.15) and (B.16), to zero yield the following FOCs:









(pOk − cOk − γOk)
vOk(pOk)∑
k∈SO vOk(pOk) + exp(αO)
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and

















































Observe that fixing n ∈ {R,O}, the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equations
are the same for all z ∈ Sn. Therefore, pnz − cnz − γnz = mn for all z ∈ Sn. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13: Recall that the assortments SR and SO are fixed for
the purposes of this proposition; hence we drop them from the argument list of the
functions. The firm’s expected profit as a function of margins is given by (3.7). From
Proposition 12 we know that the optimal prices must satisfy FOC (hence the optimal

















exp(ηOk−mO) . Taking the first derivatives of Π̃(mR,mO)
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mO [1− q0(mR,mO)− qO(mR,mO)]









 −mRq0(mR,mO) + 1
−mO [q0(mR,mO) + qO(mR,mO)]

− (1− β) [1− q̃0(mO)] [mOq̃0(mO)− 1] .
The above derivatives can be verified using the derivatives provided for q0(mR,mO)
and qO(mR,mO) in (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), (A.11) and the partial derivative
∂q̃0(mO)
∂mO
= q̃0(mO) [1− q̃0(mO)] .
By setting the derivatives of Π̃(mR,mO) equal to zero and rearranging, we obtain the
following FOC:
mR =






β(1− q0(mR,mO)− qO(mR,mO)) qO(mR,mO)1−q0(mR,mO) + (1− β)(1− q̃0(mO))q̃0(mO)
.
Observe from the second equality that the optimal mO will always be positive. As
for the optimal mR, it is easy to find examples where it is negative. We provide such
example in Table 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 14: Recall that the assortments SR and SO are fixed for
the purposes of this proposition; hence we drop them from the argument list of the
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the unique pair of mR and mO that satisfy the FOC of Π(mR,mO) and, furthermore,
m∗
O
= 0. Also recall that there may be more than one pair of mR and mO that satisfy
the FOC of Π̃(mR,mO), but the optimal pair of mR and mO must satisfy the FOC of




We first provide the derivative of Π(mR,mO) with respect to mR, i.e.
∂Π(mR,mO)
∂mR
=1− q0(mR,mO) [1 +mR[1− q0(mR,mO)]]
−mOq0(mR,mO) [1− q0(mR,mO)− qO(mR,mO)] .
Recall from Proposition 2 that the mO that satisfy both FOC for Π(mR,mO) is mO = 0.





= 1− q0(mR,mO) [1 +mR[1− q0(mR,mO)]] = 0. (B.17)
To conclude the proof we will show that any mR that satisfy FOC of Π̃(mR,mO)
will result in ∂Π(mR,mO)
∂mR
> 0, which will imply that the mR needs to be increased. Let








mO [1− q0(mR,mO)− qO(mR,mO)]




From Proposition 13, recall that m̃O > 0. It then follows from the equality above
that
β {1− q0(mR,mO) [1 +mR[1− q0(mR,mO)]]} > 0.
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Now we rewrite the expression above as:
β [1− q0(mR,mO)] [1−mRq0(mR,mO)]] > 0
One can check form the derivative of the no-purchase probability q0(mR,mO) that it
increases in the margin mO. Hence, we can use the above equality to write:
β [1− q0(mR, 0)] [1−mRq0(mR, 0)]] > 0.
















= 0 is the unique (mR,mO) pair
that satisfies the FOC of Π(mR,mO). This implies that, when mO = 0, Π(mR,mO) is





> 0, it now follows that m∗
R
> m̃O.
Proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 15: Suppose that the assortments, SR and SO, are fixed as
required by the proposition. Then, the firm’s problem in (3.12) reduces to picking




to maximize the profit function ΠG(SR, SO,pR,pO). In
this proof, SR and SO are dropped from the argument list of the functions.
In preparation for the rest of the proof, a list of the partial derivatives of (3.10)
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= −qG[kz](pR,pO) + qGRk(pR,pO)qGOz(pR,pO).

























(pnk − cnk − γnk)qGnk(pR,pO)


























(pnk − cnk − γnk)qGnk(pR,pO)





(pRk − cRk − γRk)qG[kz](pR,pO).
(B.19)







































Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices at a boundary, and the optimal
price vectors must satisfy the FOC.




must satisfy the property
that pRk − cRk − γRk are the same for all k ∈ SR and pOk − cOk − γOk are the same for
all k ∈ SO.
Setting the derivative in (B.18) equal to zero and rearranging the terms yields the




) with respect to pRz:




(pnk − cnk − γnk)qGnk(pR,pO) + 1−
∑
k∈SO(pOk − cOk − γOk) exp(αOk − pOk)∑
j∈SO exp(αOj − pOj) + exp(αO)
.
Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above FOC are the same for all z ∈ SR.
Therefore, pRk − cRk − γRk = mR for all k ∈ SR. Now, set the derivative in (B.19)










(pnk − cnk − γnk)qGnk(pR,pO) + 1−
∑
k∈SR(pRk − cRk − γRk) exp(αRk − pRk)∑
i∈SR exp(αRi − pRi) + exp(αR)
.
Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above FOC are the same for all z ∈ SO.
Therefore, pOk − cOk − γOk = mO for all k ∈ SO.
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Appendix C
Proofs of Propositions in Chapter IV
Proofs for Section 4.4
In preparation for the proofs that follow, we note below the derivatives of purchase
probabilities defined in Section 4.3.1. The following derivatives can be verified through




























The proofs of the propositions in Section 4.4 are for any given SR; hence SR is dropped
from the argument list of the functions.
Proof of Proposition 16: The retailer’s problem in (4.8) reduces to picking the
price vector pR to maximize its expected profit function ΠR(pM,w,pR). We start by
proving that any optimal price vector pR must satisfy the first order conditions (FOC)
of the retailer’s objective function ΠR(pM,w,pR).
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Using the derivatives of the functions provided in (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) it can

















− (pRk − wk − γk) + µ2
 . (C.4)











Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices at a boundary, and the optimal
price vector must satisfy the FOC.
To conclude the proof of the proposition, we next prove that any optimal price
vector pR must satisfy the property that pRk −wk− γk is the same for all k ∈ SR. Set-
ting the derivative of ΠR(pM,w,pR), provided in (C.4), equal to zero and re-arranging
terms yields the following FOC for ΠR(pM,w,pR):
pRk − wk − γk =
∑
k∈SR







Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation is the same for all
k ∈ SR. Therefore, pRk −wk − γk = mR for all k ∈ SR, where mR is the effective profit
margin for the retailer.
Proof of Proposition 17: In preparation for the proof, we note below that the






[1− τR(pM,mR)] < 0.
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Using this derivative it can be verified that the derivative of ΠR(pM,mR), given in











Recall from Proposition 16 that the optimal prices must be interior solutions, that
is, −∞ < pRk <∞ for k ∈ SR. In addition, observe from Proposition 16, the margin,
mR, and the price, pRk, differ by wk + γk. Therefore, for finite w, the optimal margin
mR must also be an interior solution, i.e., −∞ < mR < ∞. Thus, mR must satisfy
the FOC of ΠR(pM,mR).
Setting the derivative of ΠR(pM,mR) (provided in (C.5)) equal to zero and rear-





To conclude, we next prove that the mR that satisfies this FOC is in fact unique.
Substituting for τR(pM,mR) in (C.6) with the expression provided in (4.15) and alge-

























Applying the definition of the Lambert-W function (provided in the preamble of



















Observe that the right-hand side of the above equality does not depend on mR and
the left-hand side is strictly increasing in mR. Therefore, there exists a unique mR
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that satisfies the FOC.
Proof of Proposition 18: This proof will proceed in two steps. In Step 1, we
will rewrite the manufacturer’s profit, given in (4.10), as a function of the optimal
effective margin chosen by the retailer in response to the manufacturer’s wholesale
and direct channel price vector, i.e., mR(pM,w) as provided in (C.7). In Step 2, we
will use this version of the manufacturer’s profit function to prove the properties that
the manufacturer’s optimal price vector must satisfy.









where τR(pM,mR(pM,w)), τM(pM,mR(pM,w)) and qRk(m



























for all k ∈ SR.
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Using the expression above we can write mR(pM,w) in (C.7) as
mR(pM,w) = µ1 [1 +W (Ω(p
M,w))] .
Observe from Proposition 17 that τR(pM,mR(pM,w)) = 1 − µ1
mR(pM,w)
. Substi-
tuting in this expression for mR(pM,w) with µ1 [1 +W (Ω(p






Next we recast τM(pM,pR) in (4.4) in terms of mR(pM,w) instead of pR. To
that end, we replace vk(p
R
















]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SR vRk(mR(pM,w))]µ2/µ1 . (C.10)
Given that mR(pM,w) = µ1 [1 +W (Ω(p
M,w))] the definition Ω(pM,w) and the
fact that for any value a > 0 we have that exp(W (a)) = a
W (a)
















exp([ηRk − µ1 [1 +W (Ω(pM,w))] /µ2)
]µ2/µ1
= W (Ω(pM,w))


















]µ2/µ1] [1 +W (Ω(pM,w))] . (C.11)
As for qRk(p











for all k ∈ SR. (C.12)
Provided the expressions above for the purchase probabilities, i.e. (C.9), (C.11)








(wk − ck)θkqRk(SR,mR(SR,pM,w)). (C.13)
Step 2: To continue with the proof, let us now show that any optimal price vector
pM and w must satisfy the first order conditions (FOC) of the manufacturer’s objective
function ΠM(pM,w,mR(pM,w)), given by (C.13). Below are the partial derivatives
of Ω(pM,w), given in (C.8), τR(pM,mR(pM,w)), given in (C.9), τM(pM,mR(pM,w)),
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given in (C.11), and qRk(m






























































, k ∈ SR.
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(pMj − cj)qMj (pM)
1− τM(pM,mR(pM,w))














































Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the wholesale prices at a boundary, and the
optimal pM must satisfy the FOC. Similarly, it can be shown that (C.15) is negative
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Hence, it is never optimal to set one of the prices for the indirect channel at a bound-
ary, and the optimal w must satisfy the FOC.
To conclude the proof of Proposition 18 (a), we next prove that any pM that satisfy
FOC of ΠM(pM,w,mR(pM,w)) with respect to pM must also satisfy the property that
pMk −ck is the same for all k ∈ SM . Setting (C.14) equal to zero and rearranging terms
yields the following:
pMk − ck =
∑
j∈SM





(pMj − cj)qMj (pM)








(wj − cj)θjqRj (mR(pM,w))τR(pM,mR(pM,w))[1− τR(pM,mR(pM,w))].
Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of the above equation is the same for all
k ∈ SM . Therefore, pMk − ck is the same for all k ∈ SM . This concludes the proof
of Proposition 18 (a). Likewise, setting (C.15) equal to zero and rearranging terms
yields the following:














(wj − cj)θjqRj (mR(pM,w)).
Observe that the RHS of the above equation is the same for all k ∈ SR. This implies
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that (wk − ck − µ2)θk is the same for all k ∈ SR. Therefore, the optimization over
prices reduces to optimizing over two margins, mM and w, where mM := pMk − ck for
all k ∈ SM , and w := (wk − ck − µ2)θk for all k ∈ SR.
Proof of Proposition 19: Recall the definition of θk provided in (4.11), i.e. θk :=
σk (zk + IN(zk))+1. We now replace IN(zk) in θk by its definition, IN(zk) := φN(zk)−
zk(1−ΦN(zk)), where φN(·) and ΦN(·) are the standard normal density and distribu-
tion functions, respectively. After replacing IN(zk) and with some algebraic manipu-
lation we obtain
θk := σk (φN(zk) + zkΦN(zk)) + 1.
We note that φN(zk) + zkΦN(zk) > 0, because limzk→−∞ [φN(zk) + zkΦN(zk)] = 0 and
φN(zk) + zkΦN(zk) increases in zk. Therefore, observe from the above equality that
θk is increasing in σk. This fact will be useful in the rest of the proof.
Now recall from Proposition 18 that w = (wk − ck − µ2)θk for all k ∈ SR. Given
that the proposition assumes that all variants are the same in all respects but σk,
notice from the expression that variants with higher θk will have lower wk. Recall
that θk is increasing in σk. Hence, higher σk implies lower wk.
Proofs for Section 4.5
For the purposes of this section, the retailer’s assortment, SR, is fixed and hence we
drop SR from the argument list of the functions. We first provide and prove three
lemmas that will be used in the proofs of the propositions in Section 4.5.
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Lemma 1. The manufacturer’s profit, ΠM(pM,w,pR) in (4.10), can be written as:
ΠM(mM, w,mR(mM, w)) =









M) = exp([αk − ck −mM]/µ2) for k ∈ SM , (C.16)
vRk(m
R(mM, w)) = exp([αk − w/θk − ck − µ2 − γk −mR(mM, w)]/µ2) for k ∈ SR,
(C.17)












]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SR vRk(mR(mM, w))]µ2/µ1 , (C.18)






















Proof of Lemma 1: Let vMk (m
M) and vRk(m
R(mM, w)) be as defined in the statement







k) is as defined in (4.2). Similarly, using Proposition 18 (b) it can be
verified that
vRk(m




Using the equalities in (C.21) and (C.22) we will make the following three obser-
vations:












]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SM vk(pMk )]µ2/µ1 .
Using the equalities in (C.21) and (C.22), observe that
τR(pM,pR) = τR(mM,mR(mM, w)),
where τR(mM,mR(mM, w)) is as defined in the statement of the lemma.












]µ2/µ1 + [∑k∈SM vk(pMk )]µ2/µ1 .
Observe that τM(pM,pR) = τM(mM,mR(mM, w)), where τM(mM,mR(mM, w)) is as de-
fined in the statement of the lemma.
Observation 3: Recall the expression for qRk(p









for all k ∈ SR.
Observe that qRk(p
R) = qRk(m
R(mM, w)), where qRk(m
R(mM, w)) is as defined in the
statement of the lemma.
Using Proposition 18, we make the following two observations.
Observation 4: From Proposition 18 (a), we have that pMk = m
M + ck. Hence,











Observation 5: From Proposition 18 (b), we have that wk = w/θk + ck + µ2.
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Hence, observe that we can write the term
∑














We now use observations 1 through 5 and substitute in the above equation:










k∈SR(wk − ck)θkqRk(pR) and mM for∑
k∈SM (p
M
k − ck)qMk (pM). This yields









Lemma 2. The manufacturer’s profit function, ΠM(mM, w,mR(mM, w)), given in
Lemma 1, can be written as:






















M) = exp([αk − ck −mM]/µ2) for k ∈ SM ,
v̂Rk(m
M, w) = exp([αk − w/θk − ck − µ2 − γk − µ1[1 +W (Ω(mM, w))]]/µ2),
τ̂R(mM, w) =
W (Ω(mM, w))



































































































Observe that the right-hand side of the expression above is the same as Ω(mM, w).
Using the Lambert-W function provided in the preamble of Appendix A, it could be
shown that the expression above can be written as:
mR(mM, w)
µ1
− 1 = W (Ω(mM, w)). (C.25)
We now use the expression above written in the form of
mR(mM, w) = µ1[1 +W (Ω(m
M, w))] (C.26)
to make some observations.
Observation 1: Recall from Proposition 17 that τR(mM,mR(mM, w)) = 1− µ1
mR(mM,w)
.
Replacing mR(mM, w) in this expression by the definition of mR(mM, w) in (C.26), we
can observe that:
τ̂R(mM, w) = τR(mM,mR(mM, w)),
where τ̂R(mM, w) is defined in the statement of the lemma.
Observation 2: Recall the expression for vRk(m
R(mM, w)) defined in Lemma 1, i.e.
vRk(m
R(mM, w)) = exp([αk − w/θk − ck − µ2 − γk −mR(mM, w)]/µ2).
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Substituting above for mR(mM, w) with µ1[1 +W (Ω(m
M, w))] we obtain:
vRk(m
R(mM, w)) = exp([αk − w/θk − ck − µ2 − γk − µ1[1 +W (Ω(mM, w))]]/µ2).
Observe from above that vRk(m
R(mM, w)) = v̂Rk(m
M, w) where v̂Rk(m
M, w) is as defined
in the lemma.
Observation 3: Recall from Proposition 18 that pMk = m
M + ck. Replacing p
M
k with
mM + ck in the expression for vk(p
M




M). Using Proposition 18 we recall also that wk = wk/θk + ck +µ2. Replacing wk
with wk/θk +ck +µ2 and vk(p
M
k ) with v
M
k (m
M) in the expression for Ω(pM,w) provided
in (C.8) we conclude that Ω(pM,w) = Ω(mM, w), where Ω(mM, w) is provided in
(C.24).












]µ2/µ1] [1 +W (Ω(pM,w))] .
Notice that replacing vk(p
M
k ) with v
M
k (m
M) and Ω(pM,w) with Ω(mM, w) in the expres-
sion above we can conclude that
τM(mM,mR(mM, w)) = τ̂M(mM, w).
Observation 4: Recall also the expression for qRk(m










Using Observation 2, we can substitute v̂Rk(m
M, w) for vRk(m
R(mM, w)), which will allow
us to observe that
qRk(m
R(mM, w)) = q̂Rk(m
M, w).
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Using observations 1 through 5, we now replace τM(mM,mR) with τ̂M(mM, w),
τR(mM,mR) with τ̂R(mM, w) and qRk(m
R) with q̂Rk(Ω(m
M, w)) in the manufacturer’s
profit function ΠM(mM, w,mR) in (C.23). This step yields







Lemma 3. Consider a manufacturer selling through the direct channel only. Let
mMk,direct := p
M
k − ck denote the gross margin for variant k ∈ SM . Then, any price
vector that is optimal for the manufacturer is such that all variants have the same
gross margin, i.e. mMk,direct = m
M
direct
for all k ∈ SM . Furthermore, the manufacturer’s







































) = exp([αk − ck −mMdirect]/µ2).
Proof of Lemma 3: For a manufacturer selling only through a direct channel,
the probability that a customer purchases from the direct channel, denoted with
τM
direct























(pMk − ck)qMk (pM). (C.31)
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− pMk + ck − 1
 .
(C.32)










Hence, pM must satisfy FOC, where the FOC are obtained by setting (C.32) equal to
zero yielding:
pMk − ck =
∑
j∈SM









Observe from above that the right-hand side is the same for all k ∈ SM . Let mM
direct
be the profit margin for the manufacturer, i.e. mM
direct
:= pMk − ck. Using this margin









































must satisfy FOC. Taking the derivative of (C.35) and setting












Proof of Proposition 20: Let mM
direct
be the manufacturer’s optimal direct channel
margin when selling through the direct channel only, and let mM
dual
be the manufac-
turer’s optimal direct channel margin when selling through dual channels, as required
by the proposition. We first derive conditions that mM
dual
must satisfy for the dual-
channel setting and provide an expression for the mM
dual
that satisfies those conditions.




























Recall from the proof of Proposition 18 that any optimal price vector for the
manufacturer must satisfy FOCs. Therefore, mM and w will also satisfy FOCs. We
next use the FOCs to derive a simpler condition that the optimal mM must satisfy.
This proof uses the functions defined in the statement of Lemma 2.
Provided next are the derivatives of the functions Ω(mM, w), τ̂R(mM, w), τ̂M(mM, w)
and q̂Rk(m


















 1− τ̂M(mM, w)[1 +W (Ω(mM, w))]






















































Using the derivatives above, it can be shown that the derivatives of ΠM(mM, w), given


































1 +W (Ω(mM, w))
]
1










µ1[1 +W (Ω(mM, w))]2
]
 . (C.39)
To obtain the FOC for the manufacturer, we set (C.38) and (C.39) equal to zero and










































Notice from the above two expressions that the RHS of (C.40) and the LHS of
(C.41) are the same. Hence, to simplify the comparison between models, we replace









M, w)W (Ω(mM, w))
]
[1− τ̂M(mM, w) [1 +W (Ω(mM, w))]]
. (C.42)
For exposition purposes, we introduce the subscript dual to the functions and vari-
ables for the problem where the manufacturer sells through two channels. Let mM
dual
be the direct channel margin that satisfies the FOCs for the dual channel problem.


























































Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that mM
direct
must satisfy the expression in (C.36).




) with its definition given in (C.34) and with
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] − 1 = 0. (C.44)
Recall that vMk (m
M) is decreasing in mM. Given that (i) the left-hand side of








, w)) is always positive, we can now conclude that the
mM
direct
that satisfies (C.44) is smaller than the mM
dual
that satisfies (C.43).




) be the manufacturer’s optimal ex-




, w) be the
manufacturer’s optimal expected profit when selling through dual channels.
Recall the expression for mM
direct





) = 1 − µ1
mMdirect






















) is going to be used later in this proof to compare
it with the manufacturer’s optimal profit for the dual channel setting.




, w) given in Lemma 2. To obtain an expres-
sion for the optimal expected profit for the manufacturer when selling through dual
channels, we first rewrite the FOC of the manufacturer with respect to mM
dual
, given
in (C.40). Observe we can rewrite (C.40) with some algebra to obtain:
mM
dual






















, w) in (C.27). We can now replace the terms that correspond









, w) = mM
dual





, w)(1 +W (Ω(mM
dual
, w)))]− µ1] . (C.46)




, as stated on Proposition 20, what is left to show in
order to prove that the expression in (C.46) is greater than or equal to the expression





, w)[1 +W (Ω(mM
dual
, w))])− µ1 > 0.









µ1. This concludes the proof of the profit comparisons between the dual channel and
direct channel strategies.
Proofs of Section 4.6
We first provide a lemma that will be used in the proofs of the propositions.
Lemma 4. The optimal margins, mM and w, for ΠM(SR,mM, w) in (C.27) must































R,mM, w)µ1[1 +W (Ω(S
R,mM, w))]−mMτ̂M(SR,mM, w).
Proof of Lemma 4: Recall from the proof of Proposition 18 that any optimal price
vector for the manufacturer, pM and w, must satisfy FOCs. Therefore, mM and w
will also satisfy FOCs. We next derive the functions F1 and F2 using as our starting
point the FOCs of ΠM(SR,mM, w) as defined in Lemma 2.
Recall the FOCs of ΠM(SR,mM, w) with respect to mM and w provided in (C.40)
and (C.41). Notice from two expressions that the RHS of (C.40) and the LHS of
(C.41) are the same. Hence, to derive the function F1 we replace the LHS of (C.40)













R,mM, w)W (Ω(SR,mM, w))
 = 0.
Observe that the left-hand side of the expression above is the same as F1 as defined
in the lemma.
As for F2, it follows directly from (C.41).
Proof of Proposition 22: Let mM∗ and w∗ be the margins that satisfy the condi-
tions F1 = 0 and F2 = 0 (provided in Lemma 4) for a given assortment. This proof
is done in two parts: In Part 1, we show that the manufacturer’s expected profit,
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ΠM(SR,mM∗, w∗) in (C.27), increases in αk for k ∈ SR. In Part 2, we show that
lim
αz→−∞
ΠM(SR ∪ {z},mM∗, w∗) = ΠM(SR,mM∗, w∗).
Part 1: We note below the derivatives of Ω(SR,mM, w), τ̂R(SR,mM, w)), and


















= τ̂M(SR,mM, w)τ̂R(SR,mM, w)
























, k ∈ SR, k 6= j.




























where F2 is as defined in Lemma 4. Recall that the optimal margins for the manu-
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Part 2: For any given pair w and mM, it can be shown that:
lim
αz→−∞
τ̂M(SR ∪ {z},mM, w) = τ̂M(SR,mM, w),
lim
αz→−∞
Ω(SR ∪ {z},mM, w) = Ω(SR,mM, w),
lim
αz→−∞
















R ∪ {z},mM, w) = 0.
Using the above limits along with F1 and F2 as defined in Lemma 4, note that any
pair of mM and w that satisfy F1 and F2 for the assortment S
R will also satisfy F1
and F2 for the assortment S
R ∪ {z} when αz goes to negative infinity. Furthermore,




ΠM(SR ∪ {z},mM, w) = ΠM(SR,mM, w).
Putting together the facts that the manufacturer’s profit function is increasing in αz,
and that at a very small αz the manufacturer’s profit function is at least as good as
the assortment that does not includes variant z, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 23: From Proposition 17 we know that the optimal effective
margin for the retailer is mR(SR,pM,w) = µ1
1−τR(SR,pM,mR(SR,pM,w)) . Hence we can write
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the profit function for the retailer given in (4.16) as:
ΠR(SR,pM,w,mR(SR,pM,w)) = mR(SR,pM,w)− µ1. (C.48)
Observe from above that the right hand side is increasing in mR(SR,pM,w). Hence,
this proof will follow after showing that mR(SR,pM,w) always increases with the
addition of a new variant to the retailer’s assortment.
It follows from (C.7) that:
mR(SR,pM,w)
µ1
















Notice that the right-hand side of the expression above is increasing in mR(SR,pM,w)
and the right-hand side depends only on problem parameters for the retailer’s pricing
problem. Hence, any change in parameters that will force the right-hand side to
increase will in fact increase mR(SR,pM,w). Let z be an available variant that can be
added to the retailer’s assortment, i.e. z ∈ SM , z 6∈ SR, and recall that the Lambert-
W function is increasing in its arguments. Observe that introducing this variant into
the retailer’s assortment will produce the following relationship,
mR(SR,pM,w)
µ1




































Hence, mR(SR,pM,w) < mR(SR ∪ {z},pM,w) which implies
ΠR(SR,pM,w,mR(SR,pM,w)) < ΠR(SR ∪ {z},pM,w,mR(SR,pM,w)).
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Proof of Proposition 24: Observe that the manufacturer’s profit under Scenario 1
will always be at least as high as the manufacturer’s profit under Scenario 2 (because
under Scenario 1 the manufacturer chooses the retailer’s assortment while the re-
tailer makes the same decision under Scenario 2). Now, recall that the manufacturer
picks its prices before the retailer. Hence, even under Scenario 2 the manufacturer
will pick the same variant that it would pick under Scenario 1 and will choose the
same wholesale and direct channel prices that it would choose under Scenario 1. The
manufacturer will make all other variants unattractive for the retailer, which could
be achieved by charging a very high wholesale price. Hence, under Scenario 2, the
retailer will offer the variant that the manufacturer will offer under Scenario 1.
Proof of Proposition 25: For this proof, we set up the simplified versions of the
retailer’s and manufacturer’s pricing problems. Consider SM = {1, 2}. Suppose the
retailer offers variant k, i.e. SR = {k}. We will prove this result by showing that
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits, evaluated at the equilibrium wholesale and
direct channel prices, are increasing in γk.
Let k be the only variant offered at the retailer, i.e. SR = {k}. Since this is
a special case of the more general model, the two conditions described in Lemma 4
continue to hold. For exposition purposes, we are going to make a few observations
taking advantage of the fact that SR = {k}.
Observation 1: Let
Ω̃(SR,mM, wk) =








From Proposition 18 we use the pricing property that w = (wk−ck−µ2)θk to observe
that Ω̃(SR,mM, wk) = Ω(S
R,mM, w), where Ω(SR,mM, w) is defined in Lemma 2.
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Using the same pricing property, we observe that:
∑
j∈SR




1 +W (Ω̃(SR,mM, wk))
, (C.51)
and













[1 +W (Ω̃(SR,mM, wk))]
. (C.52)
Using the expressions for τR(SR,mM, w) and τM(SR,mM, w) in Lemma 2 together with
Observation 1, note that
τ̃R(SR,mM, wk) = τ
R(SR,mM, w) and τ̃M(SR,mM, wk) = τ
M(SR,mM, w).
Using Observations 1 and 2, we can now write the manufacturer’s profit function
in Lemma 2 as:
Π̃M(SR,mM, wk) = τ̃
M(SR,mM, wk)m
M + τ̃R(SR,mM, wk)(wk − ck)θk. (C.53)






1 +W (Ω̃(SR,mM, wk))
]]
− µ1[1 + θkW (Ω̃(SR,mM, wk)] = 0. (C.54)
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and
F̃2 = −mMτ̃M(SR,mM, wk)







Observation 3: It can be shown that the derivatives of τ̃R(SR,mM, wk), given by











R(SR,mM, wk)[1− τ̃R(SR,mM, wk)]
µ1
.
Let mM∗ and w∗ denote the margin and wholesale price in equilibrium. Given








τ̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗)[1− τ̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗)]
µ1
mM∗τ̃M(SR,mM∗, w∗)
− (w∗ − ck)θk[1− τ̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗)]
 .
Because mM∗ and w∗ satisfy (C.55), we have





Given that (i) cok and cuk play a role only in the function γk, (ii) γk is increasing in
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cok and cuk, and (iii)
dΠ̃M(SR,mM∗,w∗)
dγk
< 0, we now conclude that Π̃M(SR,mM∗, w∗) is
decreasing in cok and cuk.
Observation 4: Recall from (C.26) that mR(mM∗, w∗) = µ1[1 + W (Ω(m
M∗, w∗))].
Given Observation 1, we can write
mR(mM∗, w∗) = µ1[1 +W (Ω(m
M∗, w∗))].
Replacing mR(mM∗, w∗) with µ1[1 +W (Ω(m
M∗, w∗))] in (C.48), we can write
Π̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗) = W (Ω̃(SR,mM∗, w∗))µ1 (C.56)
Given that the function W (·) is increasing in its arguments and µ1 is a problem param-
eter, observe that the expression for Π̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗) provided in (C.56) is strictly
increasing in Ω̃(SR,mM∗, w∗). Then to show that Π̃R(SR,mM∗, w∗) is increasing in




Observation 5: Taking the derivative of Ω̃(SR,mM∗, w∗), given by (C.50), with



































Recall the two conditions that mM∗ and w∗ must satisfy for the manufacturer’s prob-
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= θk[1 + τ̃R(S
R,mM, w)] +






M(SR,mM, w)[1 +W (Ω̃(SR,mM, w)]









F̃1 − F̃2τ̃R(SR,mM, w)
]
.
Using the derivatives above it will follow that dm
M∗
dγk



















This observation follows after noting that that 1 + dw
∗
dγk




by using the derivatives of the conditions F̃1 and F̃2 listed previously.




Since γk is increasing in cok and cuk we conclude that Π̃
R(SR,mM∗, w∗) is decreasing
in cok and cuk.
Proof of Proposition 26: In this proposition we assume all variants are the same
(which implies θk is the same for all k ∈ SR). Hence, we have that wk is the same
for all k ∈ SR. Given that all variants are the same, it is no longer the composition
of the retailer’s assortment, but the size of the retailer’s assortment that influences
profits. Let M denote the number of variants carried by the manufacturer and let N
denote the number of variants carried by the retailer. For notational convenience let
w = wk, α = αk, c = ck, γ = γk and θ = θk.
Let Π
M
(N,mM, w) be the manufacturer’s profit and Π
R
(N,mM, w) be the retailer’s














exp(−1) [N exp([α− γ − w]/µ2)]µ2/µ1
exp (α0) + [M exp([α− c−mM]/µ2)]µ2/µ1
. (C.59)
Given that all variants are the same for the purposes of this proposition, then observe










exp(α0) + [M exp([α− c−mM]/µ2)]µ2/µ1
]
[1 +W (Ω(N,mM, w))]
. (C.61)
Using Observation 1, note that τR(N,mM, w) = τR(SR,mM, w) and τM(N,mM, w) =




(N,mM, w) = µ1W (Ω(N,m
M, w)),
and
ΠM(N,mM, w) = τM(N,mM, w)mM + τR(N,mM, w)(w − c)θ, (C.62)
Using Observation 2, note that
Π
R
(N,mM, w) = ΠR(SR,mM, w) and Π
M
(N,mM, w) = ΠM(SR,mM, w).
Given that the problem in this proposition is a simplification of the general prob-
lem, the conditions in Lemma 4 continue to hold. Using Observations 1 through 3,
conditions F1 and F2 in Lemma 4 can now be simplified to F 1 and F 2 as follows:





1 +W (Ω(N,mM, w))
]]






+mMτM(N,mM, w)− (w − c)θ[1− τR(N,mM, w)].
The conditions above will be used later to find the derivatives of the retailer’s and
manufacturer’s profit functions.
We next provide some partial derivatives that will help with the derivations of the
profit functions. The derivatives for Ω(N,mM, w) in (C.59), τR(N,mM, w) in (C.60),
























































































= −θ[1 + τR(N,mM, wk)].
Using implicit differentiation we find the following derivatives with respect to N for


















1 +W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))
]
+ 1/W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗)) 2τM(N,mM∗, w∗)θW (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗)) + 1/W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))
+ 2[1 + τM(N,mM∗, w∗)θ[W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))]2]

.
Observe that (C.64) is smaller than (C.63) when
τM(N,mM∗, w∗)θ
[
1 +W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))
]
+ 1/W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗)) 2τM(N,mM∗, w∗)θW (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗)) + 1/W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))
+ 2[1 + τM(N,mM∗, w∗)θ[W (Ω(N,mM∗, w∗))]2]

< 1. (C.65)
One can show that the above condition holds when
τM(N,mM∗, w∗)
[






Hence, we conclude that when θ < 2 (C.64) is smaller than (C.63).
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